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8 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
9 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

10 ANGEL MENDEZ, et al.,

11 Plaintiffs,

12 vs.

13 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.,

14 Defendants.  
15  
16

CASE NO. CV 11-04771-MWF (PJWx)

**FINDINGS OF FACT AND  
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

17  
18 This matter came on for trial before the Court sitting without a jury on  
19 February 26, 27, 28, March 1, and April 19, 2013. Following the presentation of  
20 evidence, the parties filed supplemental briefs, and after closing arguments the  
21 matter was taken under submission. The Court then ordered, and the parties filed,  
22 supplemental briefs regarding *Alexander v. City of San Francisco*, 29 F.3d 1355 (9th  
23 Cir. 1994), and *Billington v. Smith*, 292 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2002).

24 Having carefully reviewed the record and the arguments of counsel, as  
25 presented at the hearing and in their written submissions, the Court now makes the  
26 following findings of fact and reaches the following conclusions of law pursuant to  
27 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52. Any finding of fact that constitutes a  
28

1 conclusion of law is also hereby adopted as a conclusion of law, and any conclusion  
2 of law that constitutes a finding of fact is also hereby adopted as a finding of fact.

3 **I. FINDINGS OF FACT**

4 1. On October 1, 2010, at approximately 12:30 p.m.. Defendants Los  
5 Angeles County Sheriff's Department Deputies Christopher Conley and Jennifer  
6 (Pederson) Ballis shot Plaintiffs Angel Mendez and Jennifer Lynn Garcia multiple  
7 times. Plaintiffs were living together as a couple when the shooting occurred and  
8 thereafter married. At trial and in these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,  
9 they are therefore typically referred to as Mr. & Mrs. Mendez.

10 2. When shot, Mr. and Mrs. Mendez were lying on a futon in the shack in  
11 which they resided. Deputies Conley and Pederson were searching for a parolee-at-  
12 large named Ronnie O'Dell.

13 3. At all relevant times, Deputies Conley and Pederson were acting under  
14 color of authority of their employment with the County of Los Angeles ("COLA").

15 **A. THE SEARCH FOR MR. O'DELL**

16 4. Sergeant Greg Minster was a supervisor for the Lancaster, California  
17 Station Target Oriented Policing ("TOP") Team.

18 5. Among other things, Sergeant Minster's TOP Team tracked parolees-  
19 at-large.

20 6. Deputies Billy J. Cox and Veronica Ramirez were assigned to Sergeant  
21 Minster's TOP Team.

22 7. Prior to October 2010, Sergeant Minster's TOP Team had been  
23 searching for, and attempting to apprehend, Mr. O'Dell.

24 8. Mr. O'Dell was a wanted felony suspect whom the TOP Team  
25 categorized as armed and dangerous.

26 9. There was a warrant for Mr. O'Dell's arrest.

27 10. Mr. O'Dell had evaded prior attempts to apprehend him.

1 **B. ON OCTOBER 1, 2010, MR. O'DELL REPORTEDLY WAS SPOTTED**  
2 **AT AN ALBERTSON'S GROCERY STORE IN LANCASTER**

3 11. On the morning of October 1, 2010, Officer Adam Zeko observed a  
4 man he believed to be Mr. O'Dell entering an Albertson's grocery store located at  
5 the intersection of 20th Street and K Street in Lancaster.

6 12. Officer Zeko reported to the Lancaster Station that he thought he had  
7 seen Mr. Odell.

8 13. Approximately twelve police officers, including Deputies Conley and  
9 Pederson, responded to the Albertson's.

10 14. Deputies Conley and Pederson were partners assigned to the Lancaster  
11 Station Community Oriented Policing ("COPS") Unit.

12 15. However, on October 1, 2010, Deputies Conley and Pederson were  
13 directed to supplement and assist Sergeant Minster's TOP Team.

14 16. Prior to October 1, 2010, Deputies Conley and Pederson did not have  
15 any information regarding Mr. O'Dell.

16 17. Mr. O'Dell was not found or captured at the Albertson's.

17 **C. THE RESPONDING OFFICERS THEN MET BEHIND THE**  
18 **ALBERTSON'S**

19 18. The responding officers then met behind the Albertson's to debrief.

20 19. During the debriefing session, Deputy Claudia Rissling received a tip  
21 from a confidential informant that a man he believed to be Mr. O'Dell was riding a  
22 bicycle in front of 43263 18th Street West in Lancaster, a private residence owned  
23 by Paula Hughes.

24 20. The responding officers then developed a plan in light of the tip  
25 regarding Mr. O'Dell's whereabouts.

26 21. A team of officers would proceed to the residence of Roseanne Larsen,  
27 which was located at 43520 18th Street West, Lancaster, California.  
28

1           22.    The officers had information that Mr. O'Dell previously had been at the  
2 Larsen residence, and the officers believed that there was a possibility that Mr.  
3 O'Dell already had left the Hughes residence.

4           23.    At the same time, Sergeant Minster's TOP Team, as well as Deputies  
5 Conley and Pederson, would proceed to the Hughes residence.

6           24.    Deputies Conley and Pederson were assigned to clear the rear of the  
7 Hughes property for the officers' safety (should Mr. O'Dell be hiding thereabouts)  
8 and cover the back door of the Hughes residence for containment (should Mr.  
9 O'Dell try to escape to the rear of the Hughes property).

10          25.    During the debriefing/planning session, Deputy Rissling announced to  
11 the responding officers that a male named Angel (Mendez) lived in the backyard of  
12 the Hughes residence with a pregnant lady (Mrs. Mendez).

13          26.    Deputies Conley and Pederson heard Deputy Rissling make this  
14 announcement. Deputy Pederson testified that she heard the announcement.  
15 Deputy Conley testified that he did not recall any such announcement. Either he did  
16 not recall the announcement at trial or he unreasonably failed to pay attention when  
17 the announcement was made.

18 **D.    SERGEANT MINSTER AND DEPUTIES COX, RAMIREZ, CONLEY**  
19 **AND PEDERSON PROCEEDED TO THE HUGHES RESIDENCE**

20          27.    Sergeant Minster and Deputies Cox, Ramirez, Conley and Pederson  
21 proceeded to the Hughes residence, arriving in three different patrol cars.

22           **1.    The Hughes Residence and Property**

23          28.    Ms. Hughes lived in a private residence located at 43263 18th Street  
24 West in Lancaster, California.

25          29.    The front of the Hughes residence faced east.

26          30.    The rear of the Hughes residence faced west.

27          31.    To the south of the Hughes residence was a gate that led to the rear of  
28 the property.

1           32. If one walked westward through the south gate, one would pass  
2 between the Hughes residence (to the north) and three metal storage sheds (to the  
3 south).

4           33. The three storage sheds were located within a concrete wall that ran the  
5 length of the southern boundary of the Hughes property.

6           34. Behind (*i.e.*, to the west of) the Hughes residence, a short, lightweight  
7 fence enclosed a grassy backyard area.

8           35. To the west of the backyard fence the ground surface was dirt, not  
9 grassy.

10          36. There was debris throughout the rear of the Hughes property, including  
11 abandoned automobiles located in the northwest corner of the rear property.

12           **2. The Mendez Shack**

13          37. Ms. Hughes and Mr. Mendez were friends from high school.

14          38. Mr. and Mrs. Mendez lived in a shack located in the rear of the  
15 property owned by Ms. Hughes.

16          39. The shack was located in the dirt-surface area to the rear of the Hughes  
17 property approximately thirty feet west of the Hughes residence – *i.e.*, west of the  
18 backyard fence, and southeast of the abandoned automobiles.

19          40. Mr. Mendez had constructed the shack out of wood and plywood.

20          41. Mr. and Mrs. Mendez had been living in the shack for approximately  
21 ten months.

22          42. Mr. and Mrs. Mendez were not yet married.

23          43. Mrs. Mendez was five-months pregnant.

24          44. The shack was approximately seven-feet wide, seven-feet long, and  
25 seven-feet tall.

26          45. The shack had a single doorway entrance that faced east toward the  
27 Hughes residence.

28          46. The doorway was approximately six-feet tall and three-feet wide.

1           47.    In the doorway, from the top of the doorframe, hung a blue blanket.

2           48.    Outside of the blue blanket was a hinged wooden door, which opened  
3 to the outside of the shack.

4           49.    Outside of the wooden door was a hinged screen door, which opened to  
5 the outside of the shack.

6           50.    The shack did not have any windows or other points of entry or exit.

7           51.    Located a few feet to northeast of the shack was a white gym storage  
8 locker that contained clothes, coats and other possessions.

9           52.    There were also clothes and other possessions located a few feet to the  
10 east of the shack.

11          53.    There was a tree to the north of the shack and the white gym storage  
12 locker.

13          54.    There was a blue tarp covering the roof of the shack.

14          55.    There was an electrical cord running into the shack.

15          56.    There was a water hose running into the shack.

16          57.    There was an air conditioner mounted on the north side of the shack.

17          58.    Inside the shack was a full-size futon.

18          59.    The futon ran lengthwise against the back (western) interior wall of the  
19 shack.

20          60.    The other (eastern) side of the futon was approximately three feet from  
21 the doorway to the shack.

22          61.    Mr. Mendez kept a BB gun rifle in the shack in order to shoot rats,  
23 mice and other pests.

24          62.    The BB gun rifle had a black barrel, brown stock and orange safety  
25 switch.

26          63.    The butt end of the BB gun rifle had been broken off from the barrel  
27 after someone had stepped on it.

28

1           64.    The Court examined the BB gun rifle at trial, but the BB gun rifle was  
2 not admitted as an exhibit. The BB gun rifle closely resembled a small caliber rifle.

3           65.    Ms. Hughes sometimes would open the door to the shack unannounced  
4 to “prank” or play a joke on Mr. and Mrs. Mendez.

5 **E.    SERGEANT MINSTER AND DEPUTIES COX, RAMIREZ, CONLEY**  
6 **AND PEDERSON APPROACHED THE HUGHES RESIDENCE**

7           66.    When Sergeant Minster and Deputies Cox, Ramirez, Conley and  
8 Pederson arrived at the Hughes residence, they observed a bicycle on the front lawn.

9           67.    The officers did not have a search warrant to search the Hughes  
10 residence.

11           68.    Sergeant Minster directed Deputies Conley and Pederson to proceed to  
12 the back of the Hughes residence through the south gate.

13           69.    Sergeant Minster and Deputies Cox and Ramirez went to the front door  
14 of the Hughes residence.

15           70.    Sergeant Minster banged on the security screen outside the front door.

16           71.    Sergeant Minster testified that if both the front door and the security  
17 screen had been open, he would have gone to the front door to see if someone was  
18 going to come to the front door and then contacted that person.

19           72.    From within the Hughes residence, a woman (Ms. Hughes) asked what  
20 the officers wanted.

21           73.    Sergeant Minster asked Ms. Hughes to open the door.

22           74.    Ms. Hughes asked if the officers had a warrant.

23           75.    Sergeant Minster said that they did not, but that they were searching for  
24 Mr. O’Dell and had a warrant to arrest him.

25           76.    Sergeant Minster then heard running within the Hughes residence,  
26 toward the back of the residence.

27           77.    Sergeant Minster believed Mr. O’Dell was within the Hughes  
28 residence.

1           78. Sergeant Minster directed Deputies Cox and Ramirez to retrieve the  
2 pick and ram because Ms. Hughes no longer was communicating from within the  
3 residence.

4           79. Deputy Cox set the pick into the left side of the doorframe.

5           80. At that point, Ms. Hughes again communicated from within the  
6 residence.

7           81. Sergeant Minster again stated that the officers were looking for Mr.  
8 O'Dell.

9           82. Ms. Hughes responded that Mr. O'Dell was not at her residence.

10          83. Sergeant Minster again requested that the officers be allowed to search  
11 her residence.

12          84. Ms. Hughes opened the front door and the security screen.

13          85. Ms. Hughes was pushed to the ground and handcuffed.

14          86. Deputy Ramirez placed Ms. Hughes in the backseat of one of the patrol  
15 cars.

16          87. Sergeant Minster and Deputy Cox searched for Mr. O'Dell in the  
17 Hughes residence.

18          88. The officers did not find Mr. O'Dell, or anyone else, in the Hughes  
19 residence.

20 **F. DEPUTIES CONLEY AND PEDERSON CLEARED THE THREE**  
21 **STORAGE SHEDS**

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22          89. Meanwhile, Deputies Conley and Pederson headed west through the  
23 south gate of the Hughes residence – *i.e.*, the gate to the south of the Hughes  
24 residence that led to the rear of the property.

25          90. Deputies Conley and Pederson checked each of three storage sheds  
26 between the Hughes residence and the southern wall bordering the Hughes property.

27          91. Deputies Conley and Pederson had their guns drawn because they were  
28 searching for Mr. O'Dell, whom they believed to be armed and dangerous.

1           92. Deputies Conley and Pederson did not find Mr. O'Dell, or anyone else,  
2 in the three storage sheds between the Hughes residence and the southern wall  
3 bordering the Hughes property.

4           93. At the time Deputies Conley and Pederson entered the backyard of the  
5 Hughes residence, the back door of the Hughes residence was open; Sergeant  
6 Minster and Deputy Cox were inside the Hughes residence.

7           94. Deputy Pederson informed Sergeant Minster that she and Deputy  
8 Conley would clear the remainder of the property to the rear of the Hughes  
9 residence.

10          95. Sergeant Minster assented.

11 **G. DEPUTIES CONLEY AND PEDERSON APPROACHED THE**  
12 **MENDEZ SHACK**

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13 **1. The Deputies' Point of View**

14          96. Deputies Conley and Pederson proceeded west into the dirt-surface area  
15 to the rear (west) of the Hughes property.

16          97. Deputies Conley and Pederson did not have a search warrant to search  
17 the shack.

18          98. Deputies Conley and Pederson did not "knock and announce" their  
19 presence at the shack.

20          99. Deputies Conley and Pederson recognized that the shack had a door.

21          100. Deputies Conley and Pederson were trained not to approach or stand in  
22 front of a door in case there was a threat behind the door.

23          101. Consequently, Deputies Conley and Pederson approached the shack  
24 from the south – *i.e.*, to the left of the door (from the Deputies' point of view).

25          102. As they approached the shack, Deputy Conley was in front of Deputy  
26 Pederson.

27          103. The wooden door to the shack was closed; the screen door to the shack  
28 was open.

1           104. Prior to opening the door to the shack, Deputy Conley did not feel  
2 threatened.

3           105. Deputy Conley and Deputy Pederson both testified that they did not  
4 perceive the shack to be a habitable structure. The Court finds that they acted as  
5 they did because they believed the shack to be simply another storage shed, similar  
6 to the three on the south side of the property that they had already searched.  
7 Therefore, it was their perception that the only person who might have been in the  
8 shack would have been Mr. O'Dell, trying to remain hidden.

9           106. Having listened to the testimony and examined numerous photographs  
10 of the Hughes property, the Court finds that this perception of Deputies Conley and  
11 Pederson was not reasonable. They had been told that the shack was inhabited. The  
12 shack was a different structure from the sheds. The shack was in a different  
13 location. The following were all indicia of habitation: The air conditioner, electric  
14 cord, water hose, and clothes locker.

15           107. In photographs of the scene admitted into evidence, the door to the  
16 clothes locker was open. Neither Mr. Mendez, Mrs. Mendez, nor Deputy Pederson  
17 testified to whether the door of the clothes locker was open at the time of the  
18 incident. Deputy Conley testified that he did not remember whether the door was  
19 open.

20           108. Deputy Conley opened the wooden door to the shack.

21           109. Deputy Conley pulled back the blue blanket that was hanging from the  
22 top of the doorframe.

23           110. As Deputy Conley pulled back the blue blanket, Deputies Conley and  
24 Pedersen saw the silhouette of an adult male (Mr. Mendez) holding – what they  
25 believed to be – a rifle.

1           **2.     Mr. and Mrs. Mendez's Point of View**

2           111. Mr. and Mrs. Mendez were napping on the futon inside the shack.

3           112. Mr. and Mrs. Mendez were lying with their bodies in a north-south  
4 direction and with their heads to the north side of the futon/shack.

5           113. Mr. and Mrs. Mendez were lying side-by-side on the futon with Mrs.  
6 Mendez to Mr. Mendez's right – west of him.

7           114. Mrs. Mendez was closer to the back (western) interior wall of the  
8 shack.

9           115. Mr. Mendez was closer to the door of the shack (on the east side of the  
10 shack).

11          116. Mr. Mendez had the BB gun rifle next to him on the futon – to his left,  
12 east of him.

13          117. The barrel of the BB gun rifle pointed south.

14          118. When Mr. Mendez perceived the wooden door being opened, he  
15 thought it was Ms. Hughes playing a joke.

16          119. As the wooden door opened, Mr. Mendez picked up the BB gun rifle to  
17 put it on the floor of the shack so that he could put his feet on the floor of the shack  
18 and sit up.

19          120. Mrs. Mendez also perceived the door opening but was lying on her  
20 right side, facing the back (western) interior wall of the shack.

21           **3.     Whether the BB Gun Rifle Was Pointed at Deputies Conley and**  
22           **Pederson**

23          121. The witness testimony conflicts as to how and where Mr. Mendez was  
24 holding the BB gun rifle, whether and in what direction he was moving the BB gun  
25 rifle, and whether Mr. Mendez pointed the BB gun rifle (intentionally or otherwise)  
26 at Deputies Conley and Pederson.

27          122. In court, Mr. Mendez attempted a reenactment of his getting out of bed  
28 with the BB gun rifle. Based on that demonstration and the testimony of the all the

1 witnesses, the Court finds that the barrel of the BB gun rifle would necessarily have  
2 pointed somewhat south towards Deputy Conley, even if the intent of Mr. Mendez  
3 was simply to use the BB gun rifle to help him sit-up.

4 123. Deputies Conley and Pederson perceived Mr. Mendez holding the BB  
5 gun rifle.

6 124. Deputies Conley and Pederson *reasonably* believed that the BB gun  
7 rifle was a firearm rifle.

8 125. Deputies Conley and Pederson *reasonably* believed that the man (Mr.  
9 Mendez) holding the firearm rifle (a BB gun rifle) threatened their lives.

10 **H. DEPUTIES CONLEY AND PEDERSON FIRED THEIR GUNS**

11 126. Almost immediately, Deputy Conley yelled, “Gun!”

12 127. And, almost immediately, both Deputies Conley and Pederson fired  
13 their guns in the direction of Mr. Mendez, fearing that they would be shot and killed.

14 128. At the time they fired their guns, neither Deputy Conley nor Deputy  
15 Pederson saw Mrs. Mendez.

16 129. Mr. Mendez screamed, “Stop shooting! Stop shooting!”

17 130. Deputy Conley fired ten times while moving backward (east) away  
18 from the shack.

19 131. Deputy Pederson fired five times while moving backward (east) and to  
20 her left (south).

21 132. According to their training, Deputies Conley and Pederson were  
22 “shooting and moving” until there was no threat.

23 133. Mr. O’Dell was not found in the shack or captured elsewhere that day.

24 134. No one was inside the shack other than Mr. and Mrs. Mendez.

25 **I. MR. AND MRS. MENDEZ WERE INJURED**

26 135. The gunshots injured both Mr. and Mrs. Mendez.

27 136. Mr. and Mrs. Mendez were shot multiple times and suffered severe  
28 injuries.

1           137. Mr. Mendez was shot in the right forearm, right shin, right hip/thigh,  
2 right lower back, and left foot.

3           138. Mr. Mendez's right leg was amputated below the knee.

4           139. Mrs. Mendez was shot in the right upper back/clavicle, and a bullet  
5 grazed her left hand.

6           140. The Sheriff's Department documented nine bullet holes in and around  
7 the shack and collected four bullets.

8           141. The Sheriff's Department did not determine which bullets were fired  
9 from Deputy Conley's gun and which were fired from Deputy Pederson's gun.

10          142. The Sheriff's Department did not determine how many or which bullets  
11 struck Mr. and/or Mrs. Mendez or whether Deputy Conley or Deputy Pederson fired  
12 each or any of the bullets that struck Mr. and/or Mrs. Mendez.

13 **J. DAMAGES**

14          143. Mr. and Mrs. Mendez's medical bills were admitted into evidence.

15          144. Jalil Rashti, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, testified to his treatment of  
16 Mr. and Mrs. Mendez.

17          145. Dr. Rashti also testified to Mr. and Mrs. Mendez's future medical care  
18 and provided an estimate as to the cost of future attendant care for Mr. Mendez.

19          146. There was no testimony regarding Mr. or Mrs. Mendez's life  
20 expectancy.

21          147. Mr. Mendez testified that, prior to the incident, he had earned from  
22 \$1,400 to \$2,400 per month as a construction "freelancer" or "gopher," landscaping,  
23 and working for a sanitation company.

24          148. Mr. Mendez also testified that he had not worked since 2008.

25          149. Mr. and Mrs. Mendez each testified to their emotional and  
26 psychological suffering.

27          150. Lawrence J. Coates, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, testified to his  
28 treatment of Mr. and Mrs. Mendez.

1           151. Plaintiffs filed a Statement of Damages. (Docket No. 230).  
2 Defendants filed Objections to Plaintiffs' Statement of Damages. (Docket No. 234).  
3 Certain of the objections were well taken; moreover, certain requested amounts were  
4 logically unsupported or simply grandiose. Nonetheless, *some* amount of damages  
5 for certain categories are undoubtedly deserved. The Court examined the  
6 underlying exhibits and used common sense in deciding the various sums for  
7 damages.

8           152. The position of Plaintiffs is that Mr. Mendez's life expectancy is 81  
9 years but did nothing to establish that number in the record. To the limited extent it  
10 matters, the Court believes that 70 years would be more appropriate, given the pre-  
11 shooting circumstances of Mr. Mendez's life.

12           153. The Court did not discount the medical damages to the present value, in  
13 recognition of inflation in general and the undoubted rise in the costs of medical  
14 care in particular. The Court discounted the requested amount of future earnings,  
15 both because of the sporadic nature of Mr. Mendez's employment as a manual  
16 laborer and very roughly to reflect present value.

## 17                                   **II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

18           Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. and Mrs. Mendez allege various claims  
19 under the Fourth Amendment (as applied to Defendants through the Fourteenth  
20 Amendment) of the United States Constitution. Mr. and Mrs. Mendez also allege  
21 several related California tort claims. Defendants argue that Mr. and Mrs. Mendez's  
22 Fourth Amendment claims fail because Deputies Conley and Pederson are shielded  
23 from liability by qualified immunity, and that Mr. and Mrs. Mendez's tort claims  
24 fail because the Deputies' conduct was reasonable under the circumstances.

### 25           **A. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY**

26           When the defense of qualified immunity is raised, there are two threshold  
27 questions a court must answer. First, was there a violation of a constitutional right?  
28 Second, was that right clearly established? *Saucier v. Katz*, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121

1 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001). Under the second *Saucier* prong, the  
2 question is whether the constitutional right at issue was clearly established “‘in light  
3 of the specific context of the case.’” *Scott*, 550 U.S. at 377 (quoting *Saucier*, 533  
4 U.S. at 201). “Under *Saucier*’s qualified immunity inquiry, the second question  
5 requires the court to ask whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his  
6 conduct was lawful.” *Dixon v. Wallowa County*, 336 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir.  
7 2003).

8 “The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the  
9 government official’s error is ‘a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake  
10 based on mixed questions of law and fact.’” *Pearson v. Callahan*, 555 U.S. 223,  
11 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009) (citing *Groh v. Ramirez*, 540 U.S.  
12 551, 567, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 157 L. Ed.2d 1068 (2004)).

13 Furthermore, “[t]o be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear  
14 that every reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates  
15 that right.” *Reichle v. Howards*, -- U.S. --, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093, 182 L. Ed. 2d 985  
16 (2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “In other words, existing  
17 precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”  
18 *Id.* (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “This ‘clearly established’  
19 standard protects the balance between vindication of constitutional rights and  
20 government officials’ effective performance of their duties by ensuring that officials  
21 can reasonably . . . anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for  
22 damages.” *Id.* (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

23 However, the “question is not whether an earlier case mirrors the specific  
24 facts here. Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘the state of the law at the time  
25 gives officials fair warning that their conduct is unconstitutional.’” *Ellins v. City of*  
26 *Sierra Madre*, 710 F.3d 1049, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing *Bull v. City of San*  
27 *Francisco*, 595 F.3d 964, 1003 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[T]he specific facts of  
28 previous cases need not be materially or fundamentally similar to the situation in

question.”)); *White v. Lee*, 227 F.3d 1214, 1238 (9th Cir. 2000) ( “Closely analogous preexisting case law is not required to show that a right was clearly established.”) (citations omitted); *see also Boyd v. Benton County*, 374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If the right is clearly established by decisional authority of the Supreme Court or this Circuit, our inquiry should come to an end. On the other hand, when there are relatively few cases on point, and none of them are binding, we may inquire whether the Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court, at the time the out-of-circuit opinions were rendered, would have reached the same results.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

**B. FOURTH AMENDMENT: UNREASONABLE SEARCH**

Mr. and Mrs. Mendez first argue that Deputies Conley and Pederson violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search.

Under the Fourth Amendment, “we inquire, serially, whether a search has taken place; whether the search was based on a valid warrant or undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement; whether the search was based on probable cause or validly based on lesser suspicion because it was minimally intrusive; and, finally, whether the search was conducted in a reasonable manner.” *Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n*, 489 U.S. 602, 641-42, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989) (citations omitted).

The Court addresses each of these elements in turn below.

**1. Expectation of Privacy**

The United States Supreme Court “uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by government action.” *Smith v. Maryland*, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979) (citing cases).

“In accordance with the common law, our Fourth Amendment precedents recogniz[e] . . . that rights such as those conferred by the Fourth Amendment are

1 personal in nature, and cannot bestow vicarious protection on those who do not have  
2 a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place to be searched.” *Minnesota v.*  
3 *Carter*, 525 U.S. 83, 101, 119 S. Ct. 469, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1998) (citation and  
4 internal quotation marks omitted). “The claimant must establish that he personally  
5 had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises he was using and therefore  
6 could claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment with respect to a governmental  
7 invasion of those premises.” *McDonald v. City of Tacoma*, No. 11-cv-5774-RBL,  
8 2013 WL 1345349, at \*3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 2, 2013) (citing *Rakas v. Illinois*, 439  
9 U.S. 128, 134, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978)).

10 “To establish a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy,  
11 [the plaintiff] must demonstrate both a subjective and objective expectation of  
12 privacy.” *United States v. Rivera*, 10 F. App’x 617, 620 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing  
13 *California v. Ciraolo*, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 90 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1986)).  
14 Mr. and Mrs. Mendez “have the burden of establishing that, under the totality of the  
15 circumstances, the search or the seizure violated their legitimate expectation of  
16 privacy.” *United States v. Silva*, 247 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation  
17 omitted).

18 In this case, the question is whether Mr. and Mrs. Mendez had a legitimate  
19 expectation of privacy in the shack.

20 **a. *The Mendez Shack Was Within the Curtilage of the Hughes***  
21 ***Residence***

22 “The presumptive protection accorded people at home extends to outdoor  
23 areas traditionally known as ‘curtilage’ – areas that, like the inside of a house,  
24 ‘harbor[] the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a [person’s] home and  
25 the privacies of life.’” *United States v. Struckman*, 603 F.3d 731, 738 (9th Cir.  
26 2010) (citing *United States v. Dunn*, 480 U.S. 294, 300, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 94 L. Ed.  
27 2d 326 (1987)).  
28

1 “[C]ourts have [therefore] extended Fourth Amendment protection to the  
2 curtilage to a home, defining the extent of the curtilage with reference to four  
3 factors”:

4 the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether  
5 the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature  
6 of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to  
protect the area from observation by people passing by.”

7 *Id.* at 739 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (citing *Dunn*, 480 U.S. at  
8 301). “Every curtilage determination is distinctive and stands or falls on its own  
9 unique set of facts.” *United States v. Depew*, 8 F.3d 1424, 1426 (9th Cir. 1993).

10 In this case, the shack was approximately thirty feet from the Hughes  
11 residence. While the shack was not within the fence that enclosed the grassy  
12 backyard area, it was located in the dirt-surface area that was part of the rear of the  
13 Hughes property. Mr. Mendez himself had constructed the shack. Mr. and Mrs.  
14 Mendez had lived in the shack for ten months before the date of the incident.  
15 Finally, there is no evidence in the record that people passing by the Hughes  
16 residence on 18th Street West could observe the shack without passing through the  
17 south gate and entering the rear of the Hughes property.

18 Therefore, under the *Dunn* factors, the shack was within the curtilage of the  
19 Hughes residence.

20 **b. *Even if the Shack Was Without the Curtilage of the Hughes***  
21 ***Residence, It Was a Protected Structure***

22 Moreover, the “Fourth Amendment protects structures other than dwellings.  
23 ‘[O]ne may have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than her own house so  
24 as to extend Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures  
25 in that place. [A] structure need not be within the curtilage in order to have Fourth  
26 Amendment protection.’” *United States v. Santa Maria*, 15 F.3d 879, 882-83 (9th  
27 Cir. 1994) (citing *United States v. Broadhurst*, 805 F.2d 849, 851, 854 n.7 (9th Cir.  
28 1986)) (citing *United States v. Hoffman*, 677 F. Supp. 589, 596 (E.D. Wis. 1988)

1 (“[A] person can have a protected expectation of privacy in buildings (*i.e.*, barns,  
2 garages, boathouses, stables, etc.) that are located far outside the area of the  
3 curtilage of the home.”)) (citing cases); *see also United States v. Burke*, No. CR. S-  
4 05-0365 FCD, 2009 WL 173829, at \*12 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2009) (“[A]s with a  
5 residence, the court looks to the totality of the circumstances in determining whether  
6 a defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in a storage area.” (citing *United*  
7 *States v. Silva*, 247 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2001))).

8 For the same reasons discussed above, even if the shack was without the  
9 curtilage of the Hughes residence, the shack was a protected structure.

10 **c. The Shack Was a Separate Dwelling Unit**

11 Regardless of whether the shack was within or without the curtilage of the  
12 Hughes residence, “there is no Fourth Amendment rule that provides for protection  
13 only for traditionally constructed houses.” *United States v. Barajas-Avalos*, 377  
14 F.3d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing  
15 Fourth Amendment rights in twelve-foot travel trailer). “It is quite true that a person  
16 has a right to privacy in his dwelling house, or temporary sleeping quarters, whether  
17 in a hotel room, a trailer, or in a tent in a public area . . . .” *Id.* at 1055.

18 “Because the home is accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment  
19 protections against unlawful searches and seizures, an unconsented police entry into  
20 a residential unit (whether a house, apartment, or hotel room) constitutes a search  
21 for which a warrant must be obtained.” *United States v. Cannon*, 264 F.3d 875, 879  
22 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

23 In *Cannon*, there were two structures within the fence that surrounded the  
24 defendant’s residence at 1250 Hemlock Street in Chico, California. *Id.* at 877. The  
25 government agent “***reasonably assumed***” that the second structure was a garage. *Id.*  
26 at 878 (emphasis added) (“In the evidentiary hearing, the district court found that  
27 before executing the warrant on 1250 Hemlock, the DEA agent reasonably believed  
28 the rear building to be a garage.”).

1           However, the defendant (Mr. Cannon) had converted the rear building from a  
2 garage into a self-contained residential unit approximately twenty years earlier. *Id.*  
3 Mr. Cook rented the rear building's residential unit from Mr. Cannon. The rear  
4 building itself consisted of three areas with separate entrances: Mr. Cook's dwelling  
5 unit and two storage rooms. *Id.*

6           Based on the facts of that case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the "rental  
7 unit was clearly a separate dwelling for which a separate warrant was required" and  
8 that it could not "be viewed as an extension of the main house." *Id.* at 879 (citation  
9 omitted) ("Similarly, a search of a guest room in a single family home which is  
10 rented or used by a third party, and, to the extent that the third party acquires a  
11 reasonable expectation of privacy, requires a warrant." (citing *Rakas v. Illinois*, 439  
12 U.S. 128, 140, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978))).

13           Significantly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Mr. Cook's residential unit  
14 was a separate dwelling even though the "entire rear building at 1250 Hemlock  
15 *qualifie[d] as curtilage of Cannon's residence.*" *Id.* at 881 ("Cook possessed a  
16 reasonable expectation of privacy in the rear building rooms he rented . . .").  
17 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit concluded further that, on the facts of that case, the  
18 "storage rooms were an extension of defendant Cannon's residence." *Id.* garages in  
19 Chico had often been converted without permits into student residences. *Id.* at 878.  
20 Had the rear structure still been a garage, then the warrant for the main house would  
21 have covered that garage as well. *Id.* at 880.

22           *United States v. Greathouse*, 297 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Or. 2003), is  
23 illustrative. In *Greathouse*, the district court began its analysis by noting the Ninth  
24 Circuit's observation in *Cannon* that the "rental unit contained its own kitchen  
25 appliances and its own bathroom." *Id.* at 1274. The district court continued:

26                   The government argues that because the defendant's bedroom was  
27 not a self-contained unit with its own appliance and bathrooms, and  
28 because there was no separate lock, number or entrance, the officers

1 necessarily acted reasonably in concluding that the entirety of the  
2 residence was occupied in common.

3 First, I note that the focus under *Maryland v. Garrison* must be  
4 upon the reasonableness of the officers' actions under the circumstances.  
5 When they entered the residence, they did not know that the defendant in  
6 fact kept to himself in his bedroom. However, I disagree with the  
7 government's assertion that the physical layout is dispositive. ***Doorbells,***  
8 ***deadbolts and separate appliances are certainly indicia of separate***  
9 ***units, but nothing in the case law indicates that these are prerequisites.***  
10 Nor is there any support for the assumption that unrelated people who  
11 share a house, but maintain separate bedrooms have no independent right  
12 to privacy in bedrooms maintained for their exclusive use. In this case,  
13 there is no dispute that the kitchen, bathroom and living room areas were  
14 occupied in common. There is also no dispute that the defendant's  
15 bedroom door was closed when the officers and agents entered and that  
16 he had a "Do Not Enter" sign posted on his door. There was no lock on  
17 the door, no number and no separate door bell.

18 However, the agents and officers were immediately advised by  
19 [another resident] that the defendant was a renter and that he lived in the  
20 back bedroom on the first floor. It was also apparent to the officers that  
21 there was no familial relation between any of the residents; they were  
22 simply a group of people sharing a house. I find that, upon learning this  
23 information from [the resident], when coupled with the sign on the  
24 defendant's door and the apparent absence of any familial or other  
25 connection between the residents, ***the agents at that point should have***  
26 ***known there were separate residences within the house and should***  
27 ***have stopped and obtained a second warrant for the defendant's***  
28 ***bedroom. There is no question that they could have secured the area***  
***and obtained a telephonic warrant without fear of destruction of***  
***evidence. Their failure to do [so] is an alternative basis for***  
***suppression of the evidence.***

*Id.* at 1274-75 (emphasis added).

21 In *United States v. Flyer*, No. CR051049TUC-FRZ(GEE), 2006 WL 2590460  
22 (D. Ariz. May 26, 2006), the district court distinguished *Cannon* on the facts,  
23 concluding that *Cannon* did not "support[] the necessity of a separate warrant to  
24 search the defendant's room in this case." *Id.* at \*4. In *Flyer*, the district court ruled  
25 that "there was no need for a separate search warrant before searching the  
26 defendant's room" based on the following facts:

27 The defendant's room was within the single family residence  
28 described in the affidavit and search warrant. There was no separate

1 entrance to his room from the outside of the residence. While he  
2 apparently was free to eat meals in his room, he had no refrigerator or  
3 cooking stove in his room and no separate bathroom. Although his  
4 mother described him as a “boarder”, she admitted he paid no rent and  
5 was free to eat the food she purchased for the household. Although the  
6 defendant expected other household members would “respect” his  
7 privacy and not enter his room without his consent, he did not affix  
8 another lock to his room to insure his privacy. There is no evidence the  
9 defendant objected to the search of his room during the execution of the  
10 warrant.

11 *Id.*

12 Several other cases that predate *Cannon* are instructive. In *Maryland v.*  
13 *Garrison*, 480 U.S. 79, 107 S. Ct. 1013, 94 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1987), the police officers  
14 obtained and executed a warrant to search the person of Lawrence McWebb and the  
15 “premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment.” *Id.* at 80. While the  
16 officers “reasonably believed” that there was only one apartment on the premises,  
17 the third floor was divided into two apartments, one occupied by Mr. McWebb and  
18 the other by the defendant. *Id.* But before the officers executing the warrant  
19 realized that they were in a separate apartment occupied by the defendant, they  
20 discovered the contraband that provided the basis for his later conviction. *Id.*

21 According to the United States Supreme Court,

22 If the officers had known, or should have known, that the third  
23 floor contained two apartments before they entered the living quarters on  
24 the third floor, and thus had been aware of the error in the warrant, they  
25 would have been obligated to limit their search to McWebb’s apartment.  
26 Moreover, as the officers recognized, they were required to discontinue  
27 the search of respondent’s apartment as soon as they discovered that  
28 there were two separate units on the third floor and therefore were put on  
notice of the risk that they might be in a unit erroneously included within  
the terms of the warrant.

*Id.* at 86-87. Therefore, the question was whether the failure of the officers to  
recognize the overbreadth of the warrant was reasonable. *Id.*

In *Mena v. City of Simi Valley*, 226 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2000), the officers  
secured a warrant to search a “poor house” – “a residence with a large number of

1 subjects residing in a residence designed for one family.” *Id.* at 1035. The  
2 plaintiffs, who owned the residence, argued that the search violated their  
3 constitutional rights because, “even after realizing that there were multiple units  
4 within the [plaintiffs’] house, the police searched the entire premises, including the  
5 individual residential units.” *Id.* at 1038. The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant  
6 officers argument that the “execution of the search was valid because probable cause  
7 existed to search the entire premises, not just [the suspect]’s room and the common  
8 areas.” *Id.* The Ninth Circuit determined that the officers should have realized that  
9 the house in fact consisted of a multi-unit residential dwelling, and therefore were  
10 obliged to limit their search. *Id.*

11 Here, *Cannon* is determinative for these reasons:

12 **First**, Deputies Conley and Pederson differentiated (or should have  
13 differentiated) the shack from the three storage sheds next to (to the south of) the  
14 Hughes residence. The shack was located in a different area of the rear of the  
15 Hughes property at a distance from the Hughes residence and the storage sheds.  
16 The storage sheds were metal. The shack was wood.

17 **Second**, Deputies Conley and Pederson observed (or should have observed) a  
18 number of objective indicia demonstrating that the shack was a separate residential  
19 unit: the shack had a doorway; the shack had a hinged wooden door and a hinged  
20 screen door; a white gym storage locker was located nearby the shack; clothes and  
21 other possessions also were located nearby the shack; a blue tarp covered the roof of  
22 the shack; an electrical cord ran into the shack; a water hose ran into the shack; and  
23 an air conditioner was mounted on the side of the shack.

24 **Third**, and importantly, Deputies Conley and Pederson had information that a  
25 man and woman lived in the rear of the Hughes property. In light of this  
26 information, and unlike *Cannon* and similar cases, Deputies Conley and Pederson  
27 could not have “reasonably assumed” that the shack was another storage shed.

28 Therefore, the shack was a separate dwelling unit under *Cannon*.

1                   **d.     *Mr. and Mrs. Mendez Had a Reasonable Expectation of***  
2                   ***Privacy in the Shack***

3           The “Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” *United States v. Jones*,  
4   132 S. Ct. 945, 950, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2012) (citing *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S.  
5   347, 351, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967)). Consequently, the question is not  
6   whether the shack was a protected structure, but whether Mr. and Mrs. Mendez had  
7   a reasonable expectation of privacy in the shack.

8           Mr. Mendez himself had constructed the shack. Before the date of the  
9   incident, Mr. and Mrs. Mendez had lived in the shack for ten months. Their  
10   possessions were in or around the shack. It was their home. The fact that Ms.  
11   Hughes sometimes would open the door to the shack unannounced to “prank” or  
12   play a joke on them is insufficient to show that Mr. and Mrs. Mendez did not have a  
13   subjective expectation of privacy in the shack or that this expectation was  
14   unreasonable.

15           Accordingly, Mr. and Mrs. Mendez had a subjective expectation of privacy in  
16   the shack. And this expectation was reasonable under *Cannon*.

17                   **e.     *Overnight Guest Status***

18           In addition, the “Supreme Court has carefully examined the surrounding  
19   circumstances to determine whether a guest’s status is sufficiently like home-  
20   occupancy so as to give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy. In so doing, the  
21   Court has distinguished between ‘overnight guests’ and those who were simply on  
22   the premises with the owner's permission”:

23           In the case of the overnight guest, the Supreme Court reasoned  
24   that an overnight guest seeks shelter in the host’s home “precisely  
25   because it provide[d] him with privacy, a place where he and his  
26   possessions will not be disturbed by anyone but his host and those his  
27   host allows.” Thus, the overnight guest’s expectation of privacy is  
28   recognized and a shared societal norm. The Court contrasted overnight  
  guests with persons simply present on the premises, even with the  
  owner’s permission, and concluded that “an overnight guest in a home  
  may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is  
  merely present with the consent of the householder may not.”

1 *McDonald*, 2013 WL 1345349, at \*3 (citing *Minnesota v. Carter*, 525 U.S. 83, 87-  
2 90, 119 S. Ct. 469, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1998)).

3 Based on the same set of facts, Mr. and Mrs. Mendez – at the very least –  
4 were long-term, overnight guests staying within a protected structure within or  
5 without the curtilage of the Hughes residence. For the reasons discussed above, Mr.  
6 and Mrs. Mendez had a subjective and objective expectation of privacy in the shack.

7 **2. Search**

8 “Under the traditional approach, the term ‘search’ is said to imply” the  
9 following:

10 some exploratory investigation, or an invasion and quest, a looking for or  
11 seeking out. The quest may be secret, intrusive, or accomplished by  
12 force, and it has been held that a search implies some sort of force, either  
13 actual or constructive, much or little. A search implies a prying into  
14 hidden places for that which is concealed and that the object searched for  
has been hidden or intentionally put out of the way. While it has been  
said that ordinarily searching is a function of sight, it is generally held  
that the mere looking at that which is open to view is not a “search.”

15 1 Wayne R. LaFave, *Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment* §  
16 2.1(a) (5th ed. 2012) (“The Supreme Court, quite understandably, has never  
17 managed to set out a comprehensive definition of the word ‘searches’ as it is used in  
18 the Fourth Amendment.”).

19 Here, Deputy Conley searched the shack when he opened the wooden door  
20 and pulled back the blue blanket that hung from the top of the doorframe. Deputy  
21 Pederson, however, did not search the shack.

22 **3. Probable Cause/Warrant Requirement**

23 “It is well settled under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that a search  
24 conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is ‘per se unreasonable . . .  
25 subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”  
26 *Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854  
27 (1973) (citations omitted).

1 It is undisputed that Deputy Conley did not have a warrant to search the  
2 shack, nor do any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement apply.

3 **a. Consent**

4 The “consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or  
5 effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority  
6 is shared.” *United States v. Matlock*, 415 U.S. 164, 170, 94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed. 2d  
7 242 (1974). “But the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not  
8 be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force. For, no  
9 matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the resulting ‘consent’ would be no  
10 more than a pretext for the unjustified police intrusion against which the Fourth  
11 Amendment is directed.” *Schneckloth*, 412 U.S. 218, 228.

12 The Court assumes for purposes of this analysis that Ms. Hughes could have  
13 consented to a search of the shack. Ms. Hughes opened her front door and the  
14 security screen only after Sergeant Minster and Deputies Cox and Ramirez had  
15 brought the pick and ram out from the patrol car and set the pick against her  
16 doorframe. To the extent that this can be construed as “consent,” it was coerced and  
17 consequently invalid. Nor, for that matter, did Ms. Hughes give any indication of  
18 consent to Deputy Conley’s search of the shack.

19 Furthermore, Mr. and Mrs. Mendez did not consent to the search of the shack.

20 **b. Parolee Search**

21 “[B]efore conducting a warrantless search [of a residence] pursuant to a  
22 parolee’s parole condition, law enforcement officers must have probable cause to  
23 believe that the parolee is a resident of the house to be searched.” *United States v.*  
24 *Franklin*, 603 F.3d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks  
25 omitted).

26 There is no evidence in the record that Mr. O’Dell was a resident of the  
27 Hughes residence – on the date of the incident or otherwise. This warrant exception  
28 does not apply.

1                   c.     ***Exigency/Emergency Exceptions***

2            “In particular, [t]here are two general exceptions to the warrant requirement  
3 for home searches: exigency and emergency.” *United States v. Struckman*, 603  
4 F.3d 731, 738 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The  
5 Ninth Circuit has “described these exceptions as follows”:

6                   The “emergency” exception stems from the police officers’  
7 “community caretaking function” and allows them “to respond to  
8 emergency situations” that threaten life or limb; this exception does “not  
9 [derive from] police officers’ function as criminal investigators.” By  
10 contrast, the “exigency” exception does derive from the police officers’  
11 investigatory function; it allows them to enter a home without a warrant  
12 if they have both probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is  
being committed and a reasonable belief that their entry is “necessary to  
prevent . . . the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the  
suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law  
enforcement efforts.”

13 *Id.* (citations omitted). ***“To succeed in invoking these exceptions, the government***  
14 ***must . . . show that a warrant could not have been obtained in time.”*** *Id.* (citation  
15 and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). The “police bear a heavy  
16 burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify  
17 warrantless searches or arrests.” *Welsh v. Wisconsin*, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50, 104 S.  
18 Ct. 2091, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1984).

19           Significantly, [t]here’s no disputing that the [Supreme] Court considers the  
20 curtilage to stand on the same footing as the home itself for purposes of the Fourth  
21 Amendment.” *United States v. Pineda-Moreno*, 617 F.3d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir.  
22 2010). “When the warrantless search is to home or curtilage, we recognize two  
23 exceptions to the warrant requirement: exigency and emergency.” *Sims v. Stanton*,  
24 706 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[C]urtilage is protected to the same degree as  
25 the home . . . .”); *United States v. Perea-Rey*, 680 F.3d 1179, 1185 (9th Cir. 2012)  
26 (“Warrantless trespasses by the government into the home or its curtilage are Fourth  
27 Amendment searches.” (citation omitted)).  
28

1                   **d.     *Exigent Circumstances***

2           “[W]arrants are generally required to search a person’s home or his person  
3 unless the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so  
4 compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth  
5 Amendment.” *United States v. Snipe*, 515 F.3d 947, 950 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation  
6 and internal quotation marks omitted). “It is clearly established Federal law that the  
7 warrantless search of a dwelling must be supported by probable cause and the  
8 existence of exigent circumstances.” *Struckman*, 603 F.3d at 739 (citation and  
9 internal quotation marks omitted).

10          “[W]hen the government relies on the exigent circumstances exception [to the  
11 Fourth Amendment warrant requirement], it . . . must satisfy two requirements:  
12 first, the government must prove that the officer had probable cause to search the  
13 house; and second, the government must prove that exigent circumstances justified  
14 the warrantless intrusion.” *Id.* (citations omitted).

15                   **(i).     Probable Cause**

16          “Generally, if a structure is divided into more than one occupancy unit,  
17 probable cause must exist for each unit to be searched.” *Mena*, 226 F.3d at 1038  
18 (citation omitted). “This rule, however, is not absolute. For example, we have held  
19 that a warrant is valid when it authorizes the search of a street address with several  
20 dwellings if the defendants are in control of the whole premises, if the dwellings are  
21 occupied in common, or if the entire property is suspect.” *Id.* (citations omitted)  
22 (concluding that the officers had probable cause to search, at most, the suspect’s  
23 room and one other room, in addition to the common areas, but not any of the other  
24 rooms); *see also United States v. Whitten*, 706 F.2d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[A]  
25 warrant may authorize a search of an entire street address while reciting probable  
26 cause as to only a portion of the premises if they are occupied in common rather  
27 than individually, if a multiunit building is used as a single entity, if the defendant  
28 was in control of the whole premises, or if the entire premises are suspect.”); *United*

1 *States v. Whitney*, 633 F.2d 902, 907-08 (9th Cir. 1980) (discussing exceptions to  
2 rule that “when the structure under suspicion is divided into more than one  
3 occupancy unit, probable cause must exist for each unit to be searched.”); *United*  
4 *States v. Gilman*, 684 F.2d 616, 618 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Even if a warrant authorizes  
5 the search of an entire premises containing multiple units while reciting probable  
6 cause as to a portion of the premises only, it does not follow either that the warrant  
7 is void or that the entire search is unlawful.”).

8 Here, Sergeant Minster and Deputies Cox, Ramirez, Conley and Pederson  
9 were proceeding based on the tip from a confidential informant – relayed by Deputy  
10 Rissling at the debriefing/planning session behind the Albertson’s – that a man he  
11 believed to be Mr. O’Dell was riding a bicycle in front of the Hughes residence.  
12 When the officers arrived at the Hughes residence, they observed a bicycle on the  
13 front lawn. While Deputies Conley and Pederson were to cover the back door of the  
14 Hughes residence should Mr. O’Dell attempt to escape to the rear of the property,  
15 they also were ordered to clear the rear of the property should Mr. O’Dell be hiding  
16 somewhere thereabouts. Nothing about the confidential informant’s tip was specific  
17 to the Hughes residence as opposed to the rear of the property, including the shack.

18 Therefore, the officers had probable cause to search for Mr. O’Dell inside the  
19 Hughes residence, and Deputy Conley had probable cause to search for Mr. O’Dell  
20 inside the shack.

21 **(ii). Exigency**

22 “The exigent circumstances exception is premised on few in number and  
23 carefully delineated circumstances, in which the exigencies of the situation make the  
24 needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively  
25 reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” *Id.* at 743 (citations and internal  
26 quotation marks omitted). “We have previously defined those situations as (1) the  
27 need to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, (2) the need to  
28 prevent the imminent destruction of relevant evidence, (3) the hot pursuit of a

1 fleeing suspect; and (4) the need to prevent the escape of a suspect.” *Id.* (citations  
2 omitted). “Because the Fourth Amendment ultimately turns on the reasonableness  
3 of the officer’s actions in light of the totality of the circumstances, however, there is  
4 no immutable list of exigent circumstances; they may include some other  
5 consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.” *Id.*  
6 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “The government bears the burden  
7 of showing specific and articulable facts to justify the finding of exigent  
8 circumstances.” *Id.* (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

9 In this case, an important predicate question is whether the Court should make  
10 the determination of exigent circumstances with respect to the Hughes residence and  
11 its curtilage or separately as to the shack itself.

12 *Cannon* holds that a search of a separate dwelling unit, even if within the  
13 curtilage of the main residence, requires a separate warrant. In this case, the shack  
14 is akin to the Cook residential unit in *Cannon*. Consequently, if Deputy Conley had  
15 had a warrant to search the Hughes residence (and its curtilage), he nevertheless  
16 would have needed a separate warrant to have searched the shack itself. *See*  
17 *Cannon*, 264 F.3d 875, 877-79 (separate dwelling required separate warrant).

18 Therefore, Deputy Conley must invoke a warrant exception as to the shack  
19 itself, rather than as to the Hughes residence (and its curtilage). As the Supreme  
20 Court has made clear, the “most basic constitutional rule in this area is that searches  
21 conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or  
22 magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment – subject only to a  
23 few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.” *Coolidge v. New*  
24 *Hampshire*, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971) (citation  
25 and internal quotation marks omitted). “The exceptions are jealously and carefully  
26 drawn, and there must be a showing by those who seek exemption . . . that the  
27 exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. [T]he burden is on those  
28

1 seeking the exemption to show the need for it.” *Id.* (citation and internal quotation  
2 marks omitted).

3 The determinative question, then, is whether there was exigency to search the  
4 shack itself. Specifically, the question is whether under the totality of the  
5 circumstances it was reasonable – on account of exigency – for Deputy Conley to  
6 search the shack itself without a warrant.

7 The question is not whether there was any exigency to search the Hughes  
8 residence (and its curtilage). Consequently, the Court reaches no conclusion as to  
9 whether Sergeant Minster and Deputies Cox and Ramirez’s warrantless search of  
10 the Hughes residence was reasonable pursuant to the exigent circumstances  
11 exception to the warrant requirement.

12 With respect to the shack itself, Defendants essentially argue that there was  
13 exigency for the warrantless search to prevent Mr. O’Dell’s possible escape and for  
14 the safety of the five officers on the scene. The shack had a single doorway. If Mr.  
15 O’Dell had been within the shack, he was trapped. If Mr. O’Dell had been  
16 elsewhere on the Hughes property, then there was no exigent reason to search the  
17 shack. Deputy Conley could have obtained a warrant “in time.”

18 Likewise with respect to officer safety, if Mr. O’Dell was within the shack, he  
19 was trapped. There was no apparent threat to officer safety. Tellingly, Deputy  
20 Conley testified that, prior to opening the door to the shack, he did not feel  
21 threatened. If Mr. O’Dell had been elsewhere on the Hughes property, Defendants  
22 have failed to show that a search of the shack was “imperative” to officer safety.  
23 Moreover, the possibility that Mr. O’Dell was in the shack hiding but nobody else  
24 would have been in the shack was premised on the unreasonable belief that the  
25 shack was not a dwelling.

26 Defendants have failed to satisfy their burden in this regard. Rather than  
27 second-guess Deputy Conley’s conduct with the benefit of the hindsight, the Court  
28 concludes only that Defendants have failed to demonstrate “specific and articulable

1 facts” justifying a warrantless search of the shack based on any supposed exigency.  
2 Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that Deputy  
3 Conley’s warrantless search was *not* reasonable pursuant to the exigent  
4 circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.

5 **e. *Emergency Exception***

6 “The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is one such  
7 justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.”  
8 *Snipe*, 515 F.3d at 950-51 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The  
9 Ninth Circuit has “adopt[ed] a two-pronged test that asks whether: (1) considering  
10 the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement had an objectively reasonable  
11 basis for concluding that there was an immediate need to protect others or  
12 themselves from serious harm; and (2) the search’s scope and manner were  
13 reasonable to meet the need.” *Id.* at 952.

14 Similarly, Defendants argue that the “immediate need to protect” the officers  
15 themselves presented an emergency justifying the warrantless search of the shack.  
16 For the same reasons discussed above, the Court disagrees. There was no  
17 emergency to search the shack on the basis of officer safety, and Deputy Conley’s  
18 search was therefore unreasonable.

19 Accordingly, Deputy Conley violated Mr. and Mrs. Mendez’s constitutional  
20 right to free from an unreasonable search.

21 **f. *Qualified Immunity***

22 Defendants argue that Deputy Conley is entitled to qualified immunity in this  
23 regard because he was following orders from his superior, Sergeant Minster. But,  
24 “[c]ourts have widely held that a party’s purported defense that he was ‘just  
25 following orders’ does not occup[y] a respected position in our jurisprudence.”  
26 *Peralta v. Dillard*, 704 F.3d 1124, 1134 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations and internal  
27 quotation marks omitted). “Instead, officials have an obligation to follow the  
28 Constitution even in the midst of a contrary directive from a superior or in a policy.”

1 *Id.* (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); *Dirks v. Grasso*, 449 F. App'x  
2 589, 592 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[The defendants] cite no binding authority holding that  
3 following a superior’s orders entitles officers to qualified immunity, and none  
4 exists.”).

5 Preliminarily, it is not clear that Sergeant Minster ordered Deputy Conley (or  
6 Deputy Pederson) to search the shack. Regardless, the question is whether a  
7 reasonable officer could have believed that Deputy Conley’s conduct was lawful.

8 Deputy Conley had information that people lived in the rear of the Hughes  
9 property. In addition, as discussed above, Deputy Conley observed (or should have  
10 observed) a number of objective indicia demonstrating that the shack was a separate  
11 dwelling unit. Moreover, Deputy Conley did not have a warrant to search the shack.  
12 And, under the totality of the circumstances, no reasonable officer could have  
13 believed that a warrantless search of the shack was justified under the exigency or  
14 emergency exceptions.

15 Rather, Deputy Conley opened the door (and pulled back the blanket) to a  
16 dwelling in which he knew – or should have known – people lived. Although  
17 Deputy Conley was searching for a parolee-at-large, the shack had a single doorway.  
18 If Mr. O’Dell had been within the shack, he would have been trapped. He could not  
19 have escaped. Regardless of whether Mr. O’Dell was within the shack, there was no  
20 apparent threat to officer safety. Deputy Conley himself did not feel threatened  
21 prior to opening the door to the shack.

22 Finally, Sergeant Minster did not tell the Deputies that the shack was not  
23 inhabited and did not specifically order them not to provide knock-notice (discussed  
24 below).

25 Every reasonable officer in Deputy Conley’s position would have understood  
26 that what he was doing violated Mr. and Mrs. Mendez’s right to be free from an  
27 unreasonable search. Accordingly, Mr. and Mrs. Mendez’s right to be free from an  
28 unreasonable search was clearly established in this case.

1           **4.     Manner of Entry**

2                   **a.     *Knock-Notice***

3           “The common-law principle that law enforcement officers must announce  
4 their presence and provide residents an opportunity to open the door is an ancient  
5 one.” *Hudson v. Michigan*, 547 U.S. 586, 589, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56  
6 (2006) (citation omitted). “Since 1917, when Congress passed the Espionage Act,  
7 this traditional protection has been part of federal statutory law and is currently  
8 codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3109.” *Id.* (citation omitted). Finally, in *Wilson v.*  
9 *Arkansas*, 514 U.S. 927, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 131 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1995), the United  
10 States Supreme Court concluded that the “rule was also a command of the Fourth  
11 Amendment.” *Id.* (citation omitted).

12           “The requirements of [the federal knock-and-announce statute ] have been  
13 held to cover warrantless searches and entries of a home to make an arrest.”  
14 William E. Ringel, *Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions* § 6:7 n.2 (2d ed.  
15 2013) (citing cases) (citing *United States v. Flores*, 540 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir.  
16 1976) (“[A] warrantless entry normally requires the officer to give notice of his  
17 authority and purpose before using force to enter.”)). Furthermore, the federal  
18 knock-and-announce statute requirements have been incorporated into the Fourth  
19 Amendment. *United States v. Valenzuela*, 596 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir. 1979).

20           As the Ninth Circuit has explained,

21                   The general practice of physically knocking on the door,  
22 announcing law enforcement’s presence and purpose, and receiving an  
23 actual refusal or waiting a sufficient amount of time to infer refusal is the  
24 preferred method of entry. This method is preferable because it provides  
25 a clear rule that law enforcement can follow. It also promotes the goals  
26 of the knock and announce principle: protecting the sanctity of the  
home, preventing the unnecessary destruction of private property  
through forced entry, and avoiding violent confrontations that may occur  
if occupants of the home mistake law enforcement for intruders.

27           *United States v. Combs*, 394 F.3d 739, 744 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted);  
28           *Richards v. Wisconsin*, 520 U.S. 385, 387, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615

1 (1997) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment incorporates the common law requirement that  
2 police officers entering a dwelling must knock on the door and announce their  
3 identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry.”).

4       There is no dispute that Sergeant Minster and Deputies Cox and Ramirez  
5 complied with the knock-notice requirement as to the Hughes residence. Here,  
6 however, the question is whether Deputies Conley and Pederson were required to  
7 knock-and-announce at the door of the shack itself.

8       As a general rule, law enforcement officers “are not required to [knock and  
9 announce] at each additional point of entry into structures within the curtilage.”  
10 *United States v. Villanueva Magallon*, 43 F. App’x 16, 18 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations  
11 omitted); *see also United States v. Crawford*, 657 F.2d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 1981)  
12 (“There are no decisions directly on point dealing with [whether], after having  
13 complied with the dictates of [the federal knock-and-announce statute] at the front  
14 door, the arresting officers were then required to comply with [the statute] at the  
15 inner bedroom door. The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that where the first or  
16 contemporaneous entry is lawful under [the statute], a defendant cannot complain of  
17 the unlawfulness of subsequent entries.”).

18       For example, the Ninth Circuit has “assumed for purposes of the [statutory]  
19 knock-and-announce rule . . . that a garage is part of a house.” *United State v.*  
20 *Frazin*, 780 F.2d 1461, 1467 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1986); *Valenzuela*, 596 F.2d at 1365  
21 (“[T]he garage entry was made only after the proper entry at the residence, and  
22 officers are not required to announce at [e]very place of entry; one proper  
23 announcement under [the federal knock-and-announce statute] is sufficient.”  
24 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

25       *Villanueva Magallon*, 43 F. App’x 16, is instructive. In that case, the  
26 government had a warrant to search the premises at 792 Ada Street, Chula Vista,  
27 California (“792”). Another garage and house were on the same property – 784 Ada  
28 Street, Chula Vista, California (“784”). Law enforcement officers entered both 792

1 and 784 and discovered drugs in the latter. *Id.* at 17. The Ninth Circuit rejected the  
2 defendant’s argument that, “even if the warrant was valid, the agents did not knock  
3 and announce before they entered 784,” remarking, “This boots him nothing,”  
4 because it was “undisputed that the agents did knock and announce at 792.” *Id.* at  
5 18.

6 However, the Ninth Circuit also observed that, “[a]t any rate, nobody was in  
7 the house at 784, so [the defendant] cannot show any detriment from th[e] failure”  
8 to knock and announce before entering 784.” *Id.* More importantly, the Ninth  
9 Circuit concluded that the defendant “possessed and controlled both 792 and 784  
10 and, *in fact*, *784 was not being used as a separate residence by some third*,  
11 *innocent party.*” *Id.* at 17-18 (emphasis added) (“From the record, it is clear that  
12 784 was within the curtilage of 792.”).

13 Here, as discussed above, Deputies Conley and Pederson knew (or should  
14 have known) that the shack was a separate residence being used by third parties –  
15 *i.e.*, not Ms. Hughes. Deputies Conley and Pederson, however, did not knock-and-  
16 announce at the shack. Under *Cannon* and *Villanueva Magallon*, Deputies Conley  
17 and Pederson were required to knock-and-announce their presence at the door of the  
18 shack itself.

19 **b. No-Knock Entry Exceptions**

20 The “common-law ‘knock and announce’ principle forms a part of the  
21 reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.” *Wilson*, 514 U.S. at 929  
22 (“[T]he method of an officer’s entry into a dwelling [i]s among the factors to be  
23 considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure.”).

24 “This is not to say, of course, that every entry must be preceded by an  
25 announcement. The Fourth Amendment’s flexible requirement of reasonableness  
26 should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores  
27 countervailing law enforcement interests.” *Id.* at 934 (“[T]he common-law principle  
28

1 of announcement was never stated as an inflexible rule requiring announcement  
2 under all circumstances.”).

3 “*Wilson* and cases following it have noted the many situations in which it is  
4 not necessary to knock and announce.” *Hudson*, 547 U.S. at 589 “It is not  
5 necessary when circumstances presen[t] a threat of physical violence, or if there is  
6 reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were  
7 given, or if knocking and announcing would be futile.” *Id.* at 589-90 (citations and  
8 internal quotation marks omitted). “We require only that police have a reasonable  
9 suspicion . . . under the particular circumstances that one of these grounds for failing  
10 to knock and announce exists, and we have acknowledged that [t]his showing is not  
11 high.” *Id.* at 590 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (“When the knock-  
12 and-announce rule does apply, it is not easy to determine precisely what officers  
13 must do.”).

14 “In order to justify a ‘no-knock’ entry, the police must have a reasonable  
15 suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular  
16 circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective  
17 investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.”  
18 *Richards*, 520 U.S. at 394. “This standard – as opposed to a probable-cause  
19 requirement – strikes the appropriate balance between the legitimate law  
20 enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual  
21 privacy interests affected by no-knock entries.” *Id.* (citations omitted). “This  
22 showing is not high, but the police should be required to make it whenever the  
23 reasonableness of a no-knock entry is challenged.” *Id.* at 394-95.

24 In this context, however, the Supreme Court has “treated reasonableness as a  
25 function of the facts of cases so various that no template is likely to produce sounder  
26 results than examining the totality of circumstances in a given case; it is too hard to  
27 invent categories without giving short shrift to details that turn out to be important in  
28

1 a given instance, and without inflating marginal ones.” *United States v. Banks*, 540  
2 U.S. 31, 35, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003).

3 Moreover, where the “police claim exigent need to enter,” the “crucial fact in  
4 examining their actions” is the “particular exigency claimed.” *Id.* at 39.

5 The analysis here is similar to that above with respect to exigency/emergency.  
6 Defendants again argue that a no-knock entry was justified on the bases of effective  
7 apprehension of Mr. O’Dell and officer safety. But the shack had only a single  
8 doorway – anyone inside was trapped. And Deputy Conley testified that, prior to  
9 opening the door to the shack, he did not feel threatened – there was no apparent  
10 danger. If Mr. O’Dell was not within the shack, then there was no exigency for a  
11 no-knock entry.

12 Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, Defendants failed to  
13 introduce sufficient evidence that Deputies Conley and Pederson had a reasonable  
14 suspicion that knocking-and-announcing would have been dangerous or futile, or  
15 that it would have inhibited the effective apprehension of Mr. O’Dell. Given that  
16 the knock-and-announce requirement is part of the Fourth Amendment  
17 reasonableness inquiry, the Court cannot say that the failure to knock-and-announce  
18 in this case was reasonable.

19 Accordingly, Deputies Conley and Pederson violated Mr. and Mrs. Mendez’s  
20 constitutional right to free from an unreasonable search based on the manner of  
21 entry.

22 **c. *Qualified Immunity***

23 Again, the determinative question is whether a reasonable officer could have  
24 believed that the conduct of Deputies Conley and Pederson was lawful. As  
25 discussed above, Deputies Conley and Pederson knew (or should have known) that  
26 the shack was a separate dwelling unit. Accordingly, a reasonable officer would  
27 have recognized the need to knock-and-announce his presence before searching the  
28 shack. Nor would a reasonable officer have believed that knocking-and-announcing

1 would have been dangerous (Deputy Conley himself did not feel threatened before  
2 opening the shack door) or futile or would have inhibited effective apprehension of  
3 Mr. O'Dell (anyone inside could not have escaped). Indeed, Sergeant Minster  
4 recognized the need to provide knock-notice before a search of the main Hughes  
5 residence.

6 Every reasonable officer in Deputies Conley and Pederson's position would  
7 have understood that what they were doing violated that right. Accordingly, Mr.  
8 and Mrs. Mendez's right to be free from an unreasonable search – in the absence of  
9 Deputies Conley and Pederson's having knocked-and-announced their presence and  
10 provided Mr. and Mrs. Mendez with an opportunity to open the door to the shack –  
11 was clearly established in this case.

12 **C. FOURTH AMENDMENT: EXCESSIVE FORCE (AT THE MOMENT**  
13 **OF SHOOTING)**

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14 **1. Constitutional Violation**

15 Mr. and Mrs. Mendez next argue that Deputies Conley and Pederson violated  
16 their Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force:

17 Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is  
18 “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing  
19 of “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth  
20 Amendment interests” against the countervailing governmental interests  
21 at stake. Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that  
22 the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it  
23 the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to  
24 effect it. Because “[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth  
25 Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical  
26 application,” however, its proper application requires careful attention to  
27 the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity  
28 of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to  
the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting  
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.

*Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989)  
(citations omitted).

1 As recently elaborated by the Ninth Circuit, the *Graham* factors (which are  
2 incorporated into the applicable Model Jury Instruction 9.22) “are not exclusive and  
3 we must consider the totality of the circumstances.” *Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim*, --  
4 F.3d --, 2013 WL 1943326, at \*2 (9th Cir. May 13, 2013). The second *Graham*  
5 factor, immediacy of the threat posed to other officers or civilians, is characterized  
6 as the most important factor. *Id.* at \*3.

7 Courts are directed to give “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of  
8 each particular case” noting that “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force  
9 must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than  
10 with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” *Graham*, 490 U.S. at 396 (citation omitted).  
11 Furthermore, “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact  
12 that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments – in  
13 circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving – about the amount of  
14 force that is necessary in a particular situation.” *Id.* at 396-97.

15 The reasonableness inquiry is therefore highly fact specific and objective.  
16 *See Scott v. Harris*, 550 U.S. 372, 383, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007)  
17 (“Although respondent’s attempt to craft an easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth  
18 Amendment context is admirable, in the end we must still slosh our way through the  
19 factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’”). “A reasonable use of deadly force  
20 encompasses a range of conduct, and the availability of a less-intrusive alternative  
21 will not render conduct unreasonable.” *Wilkinson v. Torres*, 610 F.3d 546, 551 (9th  
22 Cir. 2010) (citing *Scott v. Henrich*, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994)).

23 For example, in *Garcia v. Santa Clara County*, No. C 02-04360 RMW, 2004  
24 WL 2203560 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2004), it was undisputed that defendant Deputy  
25 Dawson shot and killed the decedent (Mr. Garcia). *Id.* at \*4. The district court  
26 granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that “Dawson’s  
27 use of deadly force was objectively reasonable” and therefore that “no constitutional  
28 violation occurred.” *Id.* at \*8. The evidence in that case established that “Dawson

1 had probable cause to believe that Garcia posed a significant threat of death or  
2 serious physical injury to Dawson.” *Id.* at \*6. “First, Dawson observed that Garcia  
3 was in possession of a firearm. Second, Dawson saw Garcia pick up the gun, and  
4 begin to twist backwards towards Dawson, and move his arm holding the gun in  
5 Dawson’s direction. Third, the events occurred during a foot pursuit in which  
6 Garcia was attempting to escape.” *Id.*

7 Mr. and Mrs. Mendez do not dispute that Deputies Conley and Pederson’s use  
8 of deadly force – at the moment of shooting – was objectively unreasonable under  
9 the totality of the circumstances. Indeed, in their closing argument, counsel for Mr.  
10 and Mrs. Mendez conceded that (again, at the time Deputy Conley opened the shack  
11 door) Deputies Conley and Pederson’s use of force was reasonable given their belief  
12 that a man was holding a firearm rifle threatening their lives.

13 Mr. and Mrs. Mendez instead argue that Deputies Conley and Pederson  
14 violated the Fourth Amendment because they “created” the incident that led to the  
15 shooting. That argument is discussed below.

16 **2. Qualified Immunity**

17 Because Mr. and Mrs. Mendez have failed to prove a violation of their  
18 constitutional right to be free from excessive force in this regard, the Court need not  
19 reach the question of qualified immunity.

20 **D. FOURTH AMENDMENT: EXCESSIVE FORCE (PROVOCATION)**

21 Mr. and Mrs. Mendez’s excessive force claim, indeed their entire theory of  
22 the case, is premised upon the law of Fourth Amendment provocation. In the Ninth  
23 Circuit, “*where an officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent*  
24 *confrontation, if the provocation is an independent Fourth Amendment violation,*  
25 *he may be held liable for his otherwise defensive use of deadly force.”* *Billington*  
26 *v. Smith*, 292 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added); *Alexander v. City*  
27 *of San Francisco*, 29 F.3d 1355, 1366 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[The] plaintiff argues that  
28

1 defendants used excessive force in creating the situation which caused [the  
2 decedent] to take the actions he did.”).

3 The Ninth Circuit has explained this rule as follows:

4 In *Alexander*, the officers allegedly used excessive force because they  
5 committed an independent Fourth Amendment violation by entering the  
6 man’s house to arrest him without an arrest warrant, for a relatively  
7 trivial and non-violent offense, and this violation provoked the man to  
8 shoot at the officers. Thus, even though the officers reasonably fired  
back in self-defense, they could still be held liable for using excessive  
force because their ***reckless and unconstitutional provocation*** created  
the need to use force.

9 . . .

10 *Alexander* must be read consistently with the Supreme Court’s  
11 admonition in *Graham v. Connor* that courts must judge the  
12 “reasonableness of a particular use of force . . . from the perspective of a  
13 reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of  
hindsight.” That goes for the events leading up to the shooting as well as  
14 the shooting. Our precedents do not forbid any consideration of events  
leading up to a shooting. But neither do they permit a plaintiff to  
15 establish a Fourth Amendment violation based merely on bad tactics that  
result in a deadly confrontation that could have been avoided.

16 . . .

17 But if, as in *Alexander*, an officer intentionally or recklessly  
18 provokes a violent response, and the provocation is an independent  
19 constitutional violation, that provocation may render the officer’s  
otherwise reasonable defensive use of force unreasonable as a matter of  
law. ***In such a case, the officer’s initial unconstitutional provocation,***  
20 ***which arises from intentional or reckless conduct rather than mere***  
21 ***negligence, would proximately cause the subsequent application of***  
***deadly force.***

22 *Billington*, 292 F.3d at 1189-91 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

23 Reductively, an officer’s otherwise reasonable (and lawful) defensive use of  
24 force is unreasonable as a matter of law, if (1) the officer intentionally or recklessly  
25 provoked a violent response, and (2) that provocation is an independent  
26 constitutional violation.

1           **1. Predicate Constitutional Violation: Unreasonable Search**

2           For example, in *Federman v. County of Kern*, 61 F. App'x 438 (9th Cir.  
3 2003), the Ninth Circuit concluded that the defendants' illegal entry was (1) a  
4 constitutional violation, (2) reckless, and (3) not protected by qualified immunity.  
5 Specifically,

6           [the] plaintiffs ha[d] alleged constitutional violations: the threshold  
7 inquiry under *Saucier*. The Sheriff department's alleged reckless entry  
8 of [the decedent]'s home with a SWAT team constitutes excessive force  
9 under the Fourth Amendment. This aggressive entry without warning or  
10 a warrant, to detain [the decedent] for psychiatric examination due to his  
11 odd but relatively trivial, non-criminal behavior, provoked [the decedent]  
to resist and turned a relatively minor situation into a fatal shooting. No  
reasonable police officer could have believed that he was entitled to  
make such an entry.

12 *Id.* at 440 (citation omitted) (affirming, on interlocutory appeal, the district court's  
13 judgment denying qualified immunity to the individual defendants on the plaintiffs'  
14 excessive force claims).

15           Similarly, *Espinosa v. City of San Francisco*, 598 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2010),  
16 involved an illegal entry. *Id.* at 533. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district  
17 court "properly denied defendants' summary judgment motion on whether the  
18 officers were entitled to qualified immunity for allegedly violating [the decedent]'s  
19 Fourth Amendment rights by intentionally or recklessly provoking a confrontation."  
20 *Id.* at 538. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, "[v]iewing the evidence in the light  
21 most favorable to the plaintiffs, there is evidence that the illegal entry **created a**  
22 **situation** which led to the shooting and required the officers to use force that might  
23 have otherwise been reasonable." *Id.* at 539 (emphasis added) (citing *Alexander*)  
24 ("If an officer intentionally or recklessly violates a suspect's constitutional rights,  
25 then the violation may be a provocation creating a situation in which force was  
26 necessary and such force would have been legal but for the initial violation.").

27           As discussed above, Deputy Conley violated Mr. and Mrs. Mendez's Fourth  
28 Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search in searching the shack

1 without a warrant (or applicable warrant exception). Deputies Conley and Pederson  
2 violated Mr. and Mrs. Mendez's Fourth Amendment right to be free from an  
3 unreasonable search in and in failing to knock-and-announce before the search. As  
4 a result, Mr. Mendez picked up the BB gun rifle while sitting up on the futon within  
5 the shack, and Deputies Conley and Pederson fired their guns.

6 Under *Billington*, Deputies Conley and Pederson's predicate constitutional  
7 violations "provoked" Mr. Mendez's response, which in turn resulted in Deputies  
8 Conley and Pederson's subsequent use of force.

9 **2. Intentional or Reckless Provocation**

10 Mr. and Mrs. Mendez do not argue that Deputy Conley or, for that matter,  
11 Deputy Pederson intentionally provoked the violent response from Mr. Mendez.

12 With respect to "reckless" provocation, the Ninth Circuit in *Billington* stated,  
13 "We read *Alexander*, as limited by [*Duran v. City of Maywood*, 221 F.3d 1127 (9th  
14 Cir. 2000)], to hold that where an officer intentionally or *recklessly* provokes a  
15 violent confrontation, if the provocation is an independent Fourth Amendment  
16 violation, he may be held liable for his otherwise defensive use of deadly force."  
17 292 F.3d at 1189 (emphasis added). However, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in  
18 *Alexander* does not use the word "reckless" or any derivative thereof. *See* 29 F.3d  
19 1355.

20 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in *Duran* uses the word "reckless"  
21 (and any derivative thereof) only once:

22 The Plaintiffs' first argument is that the district court erred when it  
23 refused to give an *Alexander* instruction. This instruction is based on the  
24 case of [*Alexander*], and applies when there is evidence that a police  
25 officer's use of excessive and unreasonable force caused an escalation of  
26 events that led to the plaintiff's injury. Here, the Plaintiffs claim that this  
27 instruction should have been given because the manner in which the two  
28 officers approached the Duran residence "virtually assured a police  
shooting." Specifically, they point to the fact that the officers walked up  
the driveway with their guns drawn and never announced their presence.  
The Plaintiffs claim that this "stealth" approach "raised the likelihood"  
that "whomever they surprised would point a gun at them."

1 Accordingly, they argue the district court erred when it refused to give  
2 the *Alexander* instruction. . . .

3 Plaintiffs proposed instruction reads as follows: “If you find that  
4 [the defendant officer] **recklessly**, intentionally and/or unreasonably  
5 created a situation where the accidental or purposeful use of deadly force  
6 upon [the decedent] would become likely, such conduct would be a  
7 violation of [the decedent]’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from  
8 unreasonable seizures.”

9 221 F.3d at 1130-31 & n.1 (emphasis added). Instead, the Ninth Circuit explained  
10 the relevant standard as follows:

11 In order to justify an *Alexander* instruction, ***there must be***  
12 ***evidence to show that the officer’s actions were excessive and***  
13 ***unreasonable***, and that these actions caused an escalation that led to the  
14 shooting. Here, no such facts exist. The two uniformed officers simply  
15 walked up a driveway silently with their guns drawn. Contrary to the  
16 Plaintiffs’ assertions, nothing about these actions should have provoked  
17 an armed response. As a result, the district court did not abuse its  
18 discretion in denying the Plaintiffs’ request to give an *Alexander*  
19 instruction.

20 *Id.* at 1131 (emphasis added).

21 Returning to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in *Billington*,

22 *Alexander*’s requirement that the provocation be either intentional  
23 or ***reckless*** must be kept within ***the Fourth Amendment’s objective***  
24 ***reasonableness standard***. The basis of liability for the subsequent use of  
25 force is the initial constitutional violation, which must be established  
26 under ***the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard***. Thus, if a  
27 police officer’s conduct provokes a violent response, as in *Duran*, but is  
28 ***objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment***, the officer cannot  
be held liable for the consequences of that provocation regardless of the  
officer’s subjective intent or motive. But if an officer’s provocative  
actions are ***objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment***, as  
in *Alexander*, liability is established, and the question becomes the scope  
of liability, or what harms the constitutional violation proximately  
caused.

... .

Under *Alexander*, the fact that an officer ***negligently*** gets himself  
into a dangerous situation will not make it unreasonable for him to use  
force to defend himself. ***The Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness”***  
***standard is not the same as the standard of “reasonable care” under***  
***tort law, and negligent acts do not incur constitutional liability. An***

1 *officer may fail to exercise “reasonable care” as a matter of tort law*  
2 *yet still be a constitutionally “reasonable” officer.* Thus, even if an  
3 officer *negligently* provokes a violent response, that *negligent* act will  
4 not transform an otherwise reasonable subsequent use of force into a  
5 Fourth Amendment violation.

6 292 F.3d at 1190 (emphasis added).

7 Therefore, for purposes of *Billington* provocation, the Ninth Circuit equates  
8 “reckless” (and intentional) conduct with conduct that is *unreasonable under the*  
9 *Fourth Amendment*. In this regard, such “reckless” conduct is distinguished from  
10 “bad tactics” and conduct that is merely negligent as a matter of tort law.

11 For liability to attach under *Billington*, such “reckless” conduct need only be  
12 unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, “reckless” conduct for  
13 purposes of *Billington* provocation need not be “reckless” as a matter of tort law, so  
14 long as it is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. *See* Restatement (Third) of  
15 Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 2 (“A person acts recklessly in  
16 engaging in conduct if: (a) the person knows of the risk of harm created by the  
17 conduct or knows facts that make the risk obvious to another in the person’s  
18 situation, and (b) the precaution that would eliminate or reduce the risk involves  
19 burdens that are so slight relative to the magnitude of the risk as to render the  
20 person's failure to adopt the precaution a demonstration of the person’s indifference  
21 to the risk.”).

22 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in *Glenn v. Washington County*, 673 F.3d 864  
23 (9th Cir. 2011), confirms this understanding of the rule. In *Glenn*, the police  
24 confronted the decedent outside of his home. *Id.* at 867-68. An officer fired several  
25 beanbag rounds from a shotgun, which struck the decedent. *Id.* at 869. After the  
26 decedent was hit with the beanbag rounds, he began moving toward the house. *Id.*  
27 Because the decedent’s parents were inside the house (and potentially threatened by  
28 the movement), two other officers then fired their semiautomatic weapons, killing  
the decedent. *Id.*

1 After quoting the general rule from *Billington* (“[W]here an officer  
2 intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, if the provocation is an  
3 independent Fourth Amendment violation, he may be held liable for his otherwise  
4 defensive use of deadly force.”), the Ninth Circuit concluded as follows:

5 Because there is a triable issue of whether shooting [the decedent] with  
6 the beanbag shotgun was itself excessive force, under *Billington* there is  
7 also a question regarding the subsequent use of deadly force. Even  
8 assuming, as the district court concluded, that deadly force was a  
9 reasonable response to [the decedent’s] movement toward the house, a  
10 jury could find that the beanbag shots provoked [the decedent’s]  
movement and thereby precipitated the use of lethal force. ***If jurors  
conclude that the provocation – the use of the beanbag shotgun – was  
an independent Fourth Amendment violation, the officers “may be  
held liable for [their] otherwise defensive use of deadly force.”***

11 *Id.* at 879 (citing *Billington*) (emphasis added) (reversing the district’s ruling on  
12 summary judgment that the officers’ use of force did not violate the decedent’s  
13 Fourth Amendment rights).

14 In *Glenn*, the determinative question under *Billington* clearly was only  
15 whether there had been a predicate violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
16 Notwithstanding the general rule statement, the Ninth Circuit did not require a  
17 separate showing that the officers’ conduct was “reckless” as a matter of tort law, or  
18 in any way other than under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard.

19 Consequently, the Court need not conclude that Deputies Conley and  
20 Pederson’s predicate constitutional violations were “reckless” as a matter of tort law  
21 (or otherwise). Under *Billington* and its progeny, it is sufficient that this conduct  
22 was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and provoked a violent  
23 confrontation in which Deputies Conley and Pederson used deadly force.

24 Defendants argue that “there is no liability under *Alexander* where  
25 defendants’ conduct was *undeserving* of a violent response.” (Docket No. 242 at 3  
26 (emphasis in original)). But the Ninth Circuit has indicated that the predicate  
27 constitutional violation (here, illegal entry) need not be menacing or “provocative”  
28

1 in the sense of inciting a violent response. Rather, for purposes of  
2 *Billington/Alexander* provocation, it is sufficient that the predicate constitutional  
3 violation “created the need to use force” (*Billington*) or “created a situation which  
4 led to the shooting” (*Espinosa*).

5 *Glenn*, 673 F.3d 864, is in accord. In that case, the defendant officers did not  
6 act “provocatively” or menacingly or in a way that necessarily “deserved” a violent  
7 response. Indeed, the decedent did not react violently. Yet the Ninth Circuit  
8 concluded that the theory of *Billington/Alexander* provocation applied based on the  
9 (potential) predicate excessive force violation.

10 Nor is Defendants’ reliance on *Duran*, 221 F.3d 1127, persuasive in this  
11 regard. In *Duran*, the Ninth Circuit provided the following background:

12 At approximately 6:30 a.m., on August 15, 1994, Officer Curiel  
13 and Officer William Wallace responded to a dispatch call regarding loud  
14 music and shots fired in the vicinity of 52nd and Carmelita Street in the  
15 City of Maywood. When the officers arrived at the location, they heard  
16 music coming from inside the Duran’s garage. The officers pulled out  
their firearms and silently walked up the driveway toward the source of  
the music.

17 As they approached, the officers heard the sound of a person  
18 racking a pistol. Immediately upon hearing this sound, Officer Wallace  
19 yelled to his partner, “He just racked one.” At the same moment, Officer  
20 Curiel saw Eloy Duran emerge from behind a pickup truck in the garage  
21 holding a weapon. Officer Curiel testified that he shouted in Spanish,  
22 “Police, drop the gun,” but Duran ignored Officer Curiel’s command and  
23 pointed his weapon at the officers. Officer Curiel then fired four shots at  
24 Duran, causing him to fall to the floor. When Office Curiel approached  
25 Duran to disarm him, Duran pointed the gun at him. Officer Curiel  
stated that he shouted loudly, “Don’t, don’t, don’t.” When Duran failed  
to respond, Officer Curiel fired two more rounds into Duran’s chest. At  
this point, Duran stopped moving and Officer Curiel removed the gun.

26 *Id.* at 1129-30 (“In order to justify an *Alexander* instruction, there must be evidence  
27 to show that the officer's actions were excessive and unreasonable, and that these  
28 actions caused an escalation that led to the shooting.”).

1 On the *Alexander* issue, the Ninth Circuit stated as follows:

2 Contrary to the Plaintiffs’ assertions, the officers did not make a  
3 “stealth” approach. Officer Curiel testified that he and Officer Wallace  
4 arrived at the scene in marked police cars and that both men were  
5 wearing police uniforms. They testified further that he and Wallace met  
6 on the sidewalk in front of the Duran’s residence and walked, side-by-  
7 side, up the driveway toward the music in the garage. Although  
8 Plaintiffs are correct in pointing out that the officers had their guns  
drawn and did not announce their presence, these actions were entirely  
reasonable given that they were responding to a call that shots had been  
fired.

9 *Id.* at 1131 (concluding that the “district court did not abuse its discretion in denying  
10 the Plaintiffs’ request to give an *Alexander* instruction.”).

11 Arguably, this reasoning could be read to indicate that the district court  
12 rightly denied the *Alexander* instruction because the officers’ conduct was  
13 “undeserving” of a violent – *i.e.*, not menacing or incitingly provocative – and  
14 therefore not “excessive” or “unreasonable” or “intentional or reckless” under  
15 *Alexander*.

16 However, the Court understands this reasoning to indicate that the district  
17 court rightly denied the *Alexander* instruction because there was no evidence of a  
18 predicate constitutional violation – *i.e.*, the officers’ conduct was reasonable under  
19 the Fourth Amendment and therefore not “excessive” or “unreasonable” or  
20 “intentional or reckless” under *Alexander*.

21 Similarly, *Duran* can be distinguished on its facts. For example, in this case,  
22 with respect to the shack if not the Hughes residence, Deputies Conley and Pederson  
23 arguably did make a “stealth” approach.

24 Defendants also argue that there was no violent confrontation based on  
25 Plaintiffs’ own theory of the case (*i.e.*, Mr. Mendez simply was moving the BB run  
26 to sit up). Again, *Glenn* suggests otherwise – the decedent in that case did not react  
27 violently or in a confrontational manner.  
28

1 Accordingly, Deputies Conley and Pederson violated Mr. and Mrs. Mendez's  
2 right to be free from excessive force under a theory of *Billington* provocation. The  
3 predicate (unreasonable search) constitutional violations render their "otherwise  
4 reasonable defensive use of force unreasonable as a matter of law."

5 The Court recognizes that Deputy Pederson did not technically search the  
6 shack, as discussed above. Nevertheless, the Court concludes that Deputy Pederson  
7 is liable under *Billington* for two reasons. **First**, there is no indication in the case  
8 law that only the officer who commits the predicate constitutional violation should  
9 be held liable for the subsequent use of deadly force. Tellingly, in *Glenn*, one  
10 officer shot the decedent with the beanbag rounds (the predicate violation), and two  
11 different officers killed the decedent (the subsequent use of deadly force).

12 **Second**, as discussed above, Deputy Pederson (as well as Deputy Conley)  
13 violated Mr. and Mrs. Mendez's right to be free from an unreasonable search in the  
14 absence of a proper knock-and-announce – itself a predicate constitutional violation  
15 that directly provoked the violent confrontation and subsequent use of deadly force.  
16 If the Deputies had announced themselves, then this tragedy would never have  
17 occurred.

18 **Third**, even if "reckless" were construed in its traditional tort sense and  
19 "undeserved" meant what Defendants contend, the Court's ruling would be the  
20 same. As discussed below, the multiple indicia of residency – including being told  
21 that someone lived on the property – means that the conduct rose beyond even gross  
22 negligence. And it is inevitable that a startling armed intrusion into the bedroom of  
23 an innocent third party, with no warrant or notice, will incite an armed response.  
24 Any other ruling would be inconsistent with the Second Amendment, as discussed  
25 below.

### 26 **3. Qualified Immunity**

27 Again, the question is whether a reasonable officer could have believed that  
28 the conduct of Deputies Conley and Pederson was lawful. As in *Federman* and

1 *Espinosa*, Deputies Conley and Pederson's unreasonable search and manner of entry  
2 constituted the predicate, provocative constitutional violation that renders their  
3 subsequent use of force unreasonable as a matter of law. For the reasons discussed  
4 above, all of Mr. and Mrs. Mendez's rights in this regard were clearly established.  
5 Every reasonable officer in Deputies Conley and Pederson's position would have  
6 understood that what they were doing violated those rights.

7 In particular, both during trial and in the briefs following testimony, Deputies  
8 Conley and Pederson claim their actions were reasonable because they reasonably  
9 did not perceive the shack to be inhabited or, indeed, habitable. Based on the  
10 Court's Findings of Fact, their perception was unreasonable. Had this mistake of  
11 fact been reasonable, then there would have been no liability.

#### 12 **4. Actual and Proximate Causation**

13 A plaintiff must prove that the defendant's "actions were both the actual and  
14 the proximate cause" of the plaintiff's injury. *White v. Roper*, 901 F.2d 1501, 1506  
15 (9th Cir. 1990); *see Billington*, 292 F.3d at 1190 ("[I]f an officer's provocative  
16 actions are objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, as in *Alexander*,  
17 liability is established, and *the question becomes the scope of liability, or what*  
18 *harms the constitutional violation proximately caused.*" (emphasis added)).

19 A defendant's conduct is an actual cause of the plaintiff's injury "only if the  
20 injury would not have occurred 'but for' that conduct. *White*, 901 F.2d at 1506  
21 (citation omitted). Mr. and Mrs. Mendez would not have been injured but for  
22 Deputies Conley and Pederson's intrusion into the shack. Therefore, the conduct of  
23 Deputies Conley and Pederson was an actual cause of Mr. and Mrs. Mendez's  
24 injuries.

25 Furthermore, the "requirement of actual cause is a 'rule of exclusion.' Once it  
26 is established that the defendant's conduct has in fact been one of the causes of the  
27 plaintiff's injury, there remains the question whether the defendant should be legally  
28

1 responsible for the injury.” *Id.* (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2 “This question is generally referred to as one of proximate cause.” *Id.*

3 A defendant’s conduct is not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury “if  
4 another cause intervenes and supersedes his liability for the subsequent events.” *Id.*  
5 (citation omitted). Importantly, whether a plaintiff’s own conduct, as an intervening  
6 cause of his injury, supersedes the defendant’s liability for the results of his own  
7 conduct “depends upon what was reasonably foreseeable to [the defendant] at the  
8 time.” *Id.*

9 “The courts are quite generally agreed that [foreseeable] intervening causes . .  
10 . will not supersede the defendant’s responsibility.” *Id.* (citation and internal  
11 quotation marks omitted). “Courts look to the original foreseeable risk that the  
12 defendant created. When one person’s conduct threatens another, the normal efforts  
13 of the other . . . to avert the threatened harm are not a superseding cause of harm  
14 resulting from such efforts, so as to prevent the first person from being liable for that  
15 harm.” *Id.* (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

16 Here, Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in *McDonald v. United States*, 335  
17 U.S. 451, 69 S. Ct. 191, 93 L. Ed. 153 (1948), is informative. In *McDonald*, the  
18 defendant rented a room in a residence that the landlady operated as a rooming  
19 house. *Id.* at 452. The defendant had been under police surveillance based on  
20 suspicion that he was running a “numbers game.” *Id.* On the day of the defendant’s  
21 arrest three police officers surrounded the house during the midafternoon. The  
22 officers did not have a warrant for arrest nor a search warrant. One of the officers  
23 thought that he heard an adding machine, which frequently was used in numbers  
24 games. *Id.* Believing that the numbers game was in process, one of the officers  
25 opened a window leading into the landlady’s room and climbed through. *Id.* at 452-  
26 53. He identified himself and then let the other officers into the house. *Id.* at 453.  
27 The officers arrested the defendant in an end bedroom on the second floor. *Id.*

1 According to Justice Jackson,

2 When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought to be  
3 in a position to justify it by pointing to some real immediate and serious  
consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant.

4 . . . the method of enforcing the law exemplified by this search is one  
5 which not only violates legal rights of defendant but is certain to involve  
6 the police in grave troubles if continued. That it did not do so on this  
7 occasion was due to luck more than to foresight. Many homeowners in  
8 this crime-beset city doubtless are armed. When a woman sees a strange  
9 man, in plain clothes, prying up her bedroom window and climbing in,  
10 her natural impulse would be to shoot. A plea of justifiable homicide  
11 might result awkwardly for enforcement officers. But an officer seeing a  
gun being drawn on him might shoot first. Under the circumstances of  
this case, I should not want the task of convincing a jury that it was not  
murder. I have no reluctance in condemning as unconstitutional a  
method of law enforcement so reckless and so fraught with danger and  
discredit to the law enforcement agencies themselves.

12 *Id.* at 460-61 (Jackson, J., concurring).

13 As Justice Jackson foretold, a foreseeable risk of an unreasonable search is  
14 that the offending officers will be threatened by the resident. Indeed, this is one of  
15 the bases for the knock-and-announce rule. *See United States v. Combs*, 394 F.3d  
16 739, 744 (9th Cir. 2005) (“protecting the sanctity of the home, preventing the  
17 unnecessary destruction of private property through forced entry, and avoiding  
18 violent confrontations that may occur if occupants of the home mistake law  
19 enforcement for intruders.”).

20 In this case, it was foreseeable that opening the door to the shack without a  
21 warrant (or warrant exception) and without knocking-and-announcing could lead to  
22 a violent confrontation. Mr. Mendez’s “normal efforts” in picking up the BB gun  
23 rifle to sit up on the futon do not supersede Deputies Conley and Pederson’s  
24 responsibility. Therefore, the conduct of Deputies Conley and Pederson was the  
25 proximate cause of Mr. and Mrs. Mendez’s injuries.

26 This conclusion is consistent with the tenet that the “Second Amendment  
27 protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably for  
28

1 self-defense within the home.” *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177  
2 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010); *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 628, 128 S. Ct.  
3 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008) (“[T]he need for defense of self, family, and  
4 property is most acute” in the home). Americans own firearms for many reasons,  
5 including hunting, sport and collecting, but one of the main reasons is to protect  
6 their own homes. A startling entry into a bedroom will result in tragedy.

7 **E. LIABILITY**

8 **1. Personal Liability**

9 An officer only can be held liable for his or her “‘integral participation’ in the  
10 unlawful conduct.” *Chuman v. Wright*, 76 F.3d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1996) (Section  
11 1983 does not “allow group liability in and of itself without individual participation  
12 in the unlawful conduct”).

13 However, “‘integral participation’ does not require that each officer’s actions  
14 themselves rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” *Boyd v. Benton County*,  
15 374 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2004); *see also Hernandez v. City of Napa*, No. C-09-  
16 02782 EDL, 2010 WL 4010030, at \*11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2010) (the “integral  
17 participant” rule “extends liability to those actors who were integral participants in  
18 the constitutional violation, even if they did not directly engage in the  
19 unconstitutional conduct themselves”).

20 Moreover, in a situation where “each defendant might have committed an act  
21 that is a tort when injury results (for there is no tort without an injury), but it is  
22 unclear which defendant’s act was the one that inflicted the injury – both shot at the  
23 plaintiff, one missed, but we do not know which one missed. . . . both are jointly and  
24 severally liable.” *Richman v. Sheahan*, 512 F.3d 876, 884 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing  
25 *Summers v. Tice*, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948)) (discussing liability for  
26 excessive force under the Fourth Amendment).

1 Here, Deputy Conley is liable for unreasonably searching the shack without a  
2 warrant or applicable warrant exception. Deputies Conley and Pederson are jointly  
3 and severally liable for unreasonably failing to knock-and-announce their presence.

4 On the provocation claim, there is no evidence as to which bullet(s) caused  
5 each injury. Deputies Conley and Pederson are jointly and severally liable for  
6 unreasonable, excessive force under a theory of *Billington* provocation.

7 **2. Vicarious Liability**

8 “A municipality or other local government may be liable under [Section  
9 1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or  
10 ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation. But, under § 1983, local  
11 governments are responsible only for ‘their own illegal acts.’ They are not  
12 vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees’ actions.” *Connick v.*  
13 *Thompson*, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2011) (citations omitted).

14 In this case, there is no direct claim for liability under Section 1983 against  
15 COLA. Nor can COLA be held vicariously liable under Section 1983 for the  
16 wrongful conduct of Deputies Conley and Pederson. This formal lack of liability is  
17 not meant to undermine the legal obligation of COLA to pay the forthcoming  
18 judgment.

19 **F. DAMAGES**

20 The “basic purpose of a § 1983 damages award should be to compensate  
21 persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.” *Carey v.*  
22 *Piphus*, 435 U.S. 247, 254, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978). “[W]hen §  
23 1983 plaintiffs seek damages for violations of constitutional rights, the level of  
24 damages is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common  
25 law of torts.” *Memphis Cmty. School Dist. v. Stachura*, 477 U.S. 299, 306, 106 S.  
26 Ct. 2537, 91 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1986) (citations omitted).

27 “[N]o compensatory damages may be awarded in a § 1983 suit absent proof  
28 of actual injury.” *Farrar v. Hobby*, 506 U.S. 103, 112, 113 S. Ct. 566, 121 L. Ed. 2d

1 494 (1992) (citation omitted). However, the “law of this circuit entitles a plaintiff to  
2 an award of nominal damages if the defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional  
3 right, without a privilege or immunity, even if the plaintiff suffered no actual  
4 damage.” *Wilks v. Reyes*, 5 F.3d 412, 416 (9th Cir. 1993).

5 In awarding non-economic damages, the Court awarded an amount for Mr.  
6 Mendez that is sufficient – if invested prudently and not squandered – to raise his  
7 family in dignified circumstances. The gist of Mr. Mendez’s testimony was that the  
8 loss of his leg caused a loss of dignity and self-sufficiency. In awarding non-  
9 economic damages to Mrs. Mendez, the Court is mindful that she was pregnant at  
10 the time she was shot.

## 11 **G. STATE LAW CLAIMS**

12 As noted above, Mr. and Mrs. Mendez also allege various tort claims under  
13 California law.

### 14 **1. Assault and Battery**

15 Under California law, battery claims for excessive force by a law enforcement  
16 official are governed by the same reasonableness standard of the Fourth  
17 Amendment. *See Edson v. City of Anaheim*, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1272-74, 74  
18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614 (1998) (“By definition then, a *prima facie* battery is not  
19 established unless and until plaintiff proves unreasonable force was used.”); *see also*  
20 CACI 1305, Battery by Peace Officer; *Evans v. City of San Diego*, -- F. Supp. 2d --,  
21 2012 WL 6625286, at \*9 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012) (“Plaintiff’s [claim] for assault  
22 and battery flows from the same facts as her Fourth Amendment excessive force  
23 claim, and is measured by the same reasonableness standard of the Fourth  
24 Amendment.”).

25 For the reasons discussed above, Deputies Conley and Pederson’s use of  
26 force, at the moment of shooting, was objectively reasonable. Accordingly, Mr. and  
27 Mrs. Mendez’s claim for assault and battery fails. In addition, the Court notes that  
28

1 there appears to be no basis under California law to apply a theory of *Billington*  
2 provocation to an assault and battery claim.

3 **2. Negligence**

4 Likewise, under California law “negligence is measured by the same standard  
5 as battery and excessive use of force under the Fourt[h] Amendment.” *Morales v.*  
6 *City of Delano*, 852 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1278 (E.D. Cal. 2012); *McCloskey v.*  
7 *Courtner*, No. C 05-4641 MMC, 2012 WL 646219, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2012)  
8 (same) (citing cases).

9 For the reasons discussed above, Deputies Conley and Pederson’s use of  
10 force, at the moment of shooting, was objectively reasonable. Accordingly, Mr. and  
11 Mrs. Mendez’s claim for negligence fails – in this respect.

12 However, whether California law recognizes an analogue to *Billington*  
13 provocation under a theory of negligence is an open question. Importantly, in *Hayes*  
14 *v. County of San Diego*, 658 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit certified to  
15 the California Supreme Court a question relating to “deputies’ preshooting conduct  
16 in the context of the claim to negligent wrongful death.” *Id.* at 869 (“[W]e request  
17 that the California Supreme Court answer the following question: Whether under  
18 California negligence law, sheriff’s deputies owe a duty of care to a suicidal person  
19 when preparing, approaching, and performing a welfare check on him.”).

20 For example, in *Hayes* the Ninth Circuit discussed the California Supreme  
21 Court’s decision in *Hernandez v. City of Pomona*, 46 Cal.4th 501, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1  
22 (2009):

23 In *Hernandez*, the court granted review to consider the following  
24 question: “When a federal court enters judgment in favor of the  
25 defendants in a civil rights claim brought under 42 United States Code  
26 section 1983 . . . , in which the plaintiffs seek damages for police use of  
27 deadly and constitutionally excessive force in pursuing a suspect, and the  
28 court then dismisses a supplemental state law wrongful death claim  
arising out of the same incident, what, if any, preclusive effect does the  
judgment have in a subsequent state court wrongful death action?” The  
court held “that on the record and conceded facts here, the federal

1 judgment collaterally estops plaintiffs from pursuing their wrongful  
2 death claim, even on the theory that the officers' preshooting conduct  
was negligent."

3 In doing so, the California Supreme Court did not hold that law  
4 enforcement officers owed no duty of care in regards to preshooting  
5 conduct, as the [California] lower courts . . . had. Instead, the court  
6 found that the officers' specific preshooting conduct did not breach  
7 applicable standards of care. In light of this conclusion, the court in  
*Hernandez* declined to address the officers' claim that "they owed no  
duty of care regarding their preshooting conduct."

8 The court's extended analysis of whether the officers' preshooting  
9 conduct breached the relevant standard of care indicated, however, that it  
10 would likely not adopt the broad rule from [the California lower courts]  
11 that officers owe no such duty. Indeed, in a concurring opinion, Justice  
12 Moreno argued that the court should not have reached the issue "because  
13 plaintiffs are entitled to amend their complaint to allege preshooting  
14 negligence." The majority responded, stating "we find that plaintiffs  
have adequately shown how they would amend their complaint to allege  
a preshooting negligence claim, and that we must determine whether any  
of the preshooting acts plaintiffs have identified can support negligence  
liability."

15 There is disagreement within this court as to whether this  
16 discussion in *Hernandez* suggests that the California Supreme Court  
would not follow the holdings in [the California lower courts]. . . .

17 *Id.* at 872 (citations omitted).

18 In the absence of clear direction from the California Supreme Court, the Court  
19 concludes that California law does not provide for an analogue to *Billington*  
20 provocation under a theory of negligence. Furthermore, the Court believes that the  
21 answer to the certified question in *Hayes* is unlikely to resolve this question as it  
22 would bear on this case. Accordingly, Mr. and Mrs. Mendez's claim for negligence  
23 fails.

24 However, after the California Supreme Court decides the certified question in  
25 *Hayes*, this Court will review that decision. As appropriate, and on its own motion,  
26 the Court will alter or amend the judgment in this case pursuant to Rule 59(e).

1           **3.     Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”)**

2           Under California law, the “elements of intentional infliction of emotional  
3 distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendants with the  
4 intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional  
5 distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3)  
6 actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's  
7 outrageous conduct.” *Campos v. City of Merced*, 709 F. Supp. 2d 944, 965 (E.D.  
8 Cal. 2010) (citing *Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.*, 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1001, 25  
9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (1993) (citation omitted). “For conduct to be extreme and  
10 outrageous, it must be ‘so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated  
11 in a civilized community.’” *Id.* at 965-66(citing *Potter*, 6 Cal. 4th at 1001).

12           “In order to establish the second element, a plaintiff must show the conduct  
13 was especially calculated to cause severe mental distress.” *Mitan v. Feeney*, 497 F.  
14 Supp. 2d 1113, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (citing *Ochoa v. Superior Court*, 39 Cal. 3d  
15 159, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985)); *Ochoa*, 39 Cal. 3d at 165 n.5 (Under California  
16 law, “the rule which seems to have emerged is that there is liability for conduct  
17 exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, of a nature which is  
18 ***especially calculated to cause***, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious  
19 kind” (emphasis in original)).

20           Although the totality of Deputies Conley and Pederson’s conduct was  
21 reckless as a matter of tort law, there is no evidence that their conduct was  
22 calculated to cause mental distress, and the actual decision to shoot was, by itself,  
23 justified. Mr. and Mrs. Mendez’s IIED claim fails.

**III. VERDICT**

**In favor of Plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Mendez and against Defendants  
Deputies Conley and Pederson.**

On the Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claim (based on warrantless entry, the Court awards Mr. and Mrs. Mendez **\$1.00** in nominal damages. As discussed above, only Deputy Conley is liable on this claim.

On the Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claim (based on failure to knock-and-announce), the Court awards Mr. and Mrs. Mendez **\$1.00** in nominal damages. As discussed above, Deputies Conley and Pederson are jointly and severally liable on this claim.

On the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim (based on conduct at the moment of shooting), the Court rules in favor of Deputies Conley and Pederson.

On the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim (based on *Alexander/Billington* provocation), as discussed above, Deputies Conley and Pederson are jointly and severally liable. On this claim, the Court awards the following damages:

**Plaintiff Angel Mendez**

Past Medical Bills:	\$ 721,056
Future Medical Care:	
Prosthesis upkeep and replacement:	\$ 407,000
Future surgeries:	\$ 45,000
Psychological care (5 years):	\$ 13,300
Attendant Care (4 hours/day at \$12.00/hour)	\$ 648,240
Loss of Earnings:	\$ 241,920
<u>Non-Economic Damages:</u>	<u>\$1,800,000</u>
Total:	\$3,876,516

**Plaintiff Jennifer Lynn Garcia**

Past Medical Bills: \$ 95,182

Future Medical Care: \$ 37,000

Non-Economic Damages: \$ 90,000

Total: \$ 222,182

On the California tort claims, the Court finds in favor of Deputies Conley and Pederson.

The Court will enter a separate judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and 58(b).



Dated: August 13, 2013

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MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD  
United States District Court Judge